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Abstract 
The conditions under which young workers find their first real post-graduation jobs are 
both very important for the young’s future careers and insufficiently known given their 
public policy implications. To study these conditions, and in particular the role played 
by networks, we use a Swedish population-wide linked employer-employee data set of 
graduates from all levels of schooling which includes detailed information on family 
ties, neighborhoods, schools, and class composition over a period covering high as well 
as low unemployment years. We find that strong social ties (parents) are an important 
determinant of where young workers find their first job. This remarkably robust effect is 
estimated controlling for all confounding factors related to time, location, education, 
occupation, and the interaction of these. The effect is larger if the graduate’s position is 
“weak” (low education) or during high unemployment years, a pattern which does not 
emerge when analyzing the role of weak ties (neighbors or friends as measured using 
classmates and their parents). On the hiring side, by contrast, the effects are larger if the 
parent’s position is “strong” (e.g. by tenure or wage). We find no evidence of 
substitution in recruitment over time and fields induced by “family ties hires”. 
However, we do find that, just after their child is hired in their plant, parents experience 
a sharp drop in their wage growth. Overall, our results show that strong (family) ties are 
more important in the job finding process of young workers in weak positions than 
those weak ties usually measured in the literature (neighbors, in particular), suggesting 
that labor market experience and education  are essential conditions for weak ties to be 
strong. 
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1 Introduction 
Entry on to the labor market is a defining moment for young workers. Multiple 
decisions must be made (see among many contributions Keane and Wolpin, 1997). 
Finding and selecting the first “real” job is essential (see among many topics Beaudry 
and Di Nardo, 1991 and recently Kahn, 2010 on the impact of unemployment on wages 
of new hires). However, the precise strategies developed by these young job searchers 
to find this first job are less well-known. Among them, the use of networks should 
clearly be central. Indeed, there is a large and growing literature documenting the 
importance of networks in facilitating the process of matching workers and firms on the 
labor market. We stand at the junction of these two topics and focus on how various 
networks affect the entry conditions of young graduates. 
Nudged by Granovetter (1973, 1983), as well as by a lack of adequate data on strong 
ties, the network literature has mostly focused on weak ties. And because such weak ties 
are virtually never registered in data sources, the authors have used indirect measures of 
ties based on closeness (living in the same block, coming from the same city or the 
same country, being enrolled in the same regiment...) to examine network effects. The 
use of matched employer-employee data has offered some improvements by allowing 
researchers to focus on better-identified networks such as workers employed at the same 
firm from the same country of origin, or from the same block of housing. Again, 
however, these strategies do not ensure that the ties indeed exist within the firm or, 
more importantly, pre-existed workers’ entry at the firm and were used at recruitment. 
Recent surveys have tried to record information on the (self-declared) friends of the 
interviewees. Unfortunately, and as above, nothing allows the analyst to know if any of 
these ties was used at the moment of hiring.  
In contrast with the rest of the literature, and (to the best of our knowledge) for the 
first time, we examine the role played by networks using an empirical strategy which 
relies on directly observing all three components of the potential match: the firm, the 
hired worker, and the matchmaker. To accomplish this task, we focus on family links. 
Such social ties are clearly, using Granovetter’s words, “strong”. As a contrast, we also 
analyze indicators of ties that are “weak” (at least relative to family links) and also 
directly observed, such as classmates and their parents or those classmates that are 
neighbors versus those that are not (a way to approach the set of potential friends).   3 
Because we observe the origin – the family, the class, or the neighborhood – as well as 
the destination – the agents’ employers, together with all other employees in all 
potential destination firms, we can identify the respective roles of these ties in the 
process of obtaining the first real job. In particular, we analyze how firm (demand, 
loosely speaking) and graduate (supply, loosely speaking again) characteristics interact 
to determine when strong social ties are used, by whom, and how the use of these ties 
affects subsequent outcomes for the agents involved. Assuming that the agent of the 
match is the parent in the firm, we will be able to say important things about 
characteristics of those parents who act as go-between. Furthermore, our different 
identification strategies will allow us to examine if the parent is indeed the agent of the 
match (informing their children about job characteristics, job openings, and their 
employer about their children qualities). When studying weak ties -- classmates, or their 
parents, be they neighbors or not -- we benefit from similar advantages. Again, 
classmates should know each other, in particularly if they live in the same neighborhood 
(something we can identify) and hence be “friends”. When analyzing the role of the 
parents of these classmates, we can again directly classify the two sides of the 
relationship.   
Entry into the labor market is a good moment to examine the role of family 
networks, and contrast them with other sources of social ties because it is a time when 
the market has limited information on workers’ quality, when the worker has limited 
information on the labor market and faces maximal uncertainty regarding where suitable 
matches can be found. Parents’ information and connections can help in all these 
situations. Furthermore, most of the subjects live with their parents, or have just left 
home. Hence, information is likely to flow freely within the family, in particular about 
job vacancies; hence such strong ties do not need the type of strategic reinforcement 
often discussed in the literature on ties’ strength. Finally, weak ties through 
acquaintances met at past jobs and firms should be rarer (not existing, by construction), 
and the networks should therefore more often build on non-professional acquaintances 
such as classmates, classmates’ parents and neighbors. 
Related Literature and our Contribution: The existing literature on the extent and 
role of social networks in developed economies, is burgeoning both on the theoretical 
side (see Montgomery, 1991, or more recently Calvó-Armengol, Verdier and Zenou 4   
(2007), Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006), Calvo-Armengol, 2004, Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson, 2004 and 2007, Casella and Hanaki, 2008, among many 
authors, and Jackson, 2004 for a very thorough survey) as well as on the empirical side 
(see Munshi, 2003, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2009, Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008, 
Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan, 2000, Fredriksson and Åslund, 2009, Laschever, 
2005 again among many authors, and Ioannides and Loury, 2004 for a very detailed 
survey) after a period of relative calm following the path-breaking articles of Rees 
(1966), Granovetter (1973), and Boorman (1975). 
The “informal” hiring channel is the focus of growing number of empirical 
contributions. But the phenomenon, as happens virtually always, preceded its extensive 
study. As early as 1923, De Schweinitz (1932) finds that more than 40% of workers in 
the hosiery industry in Philadelphia obtained their job through friends and relatives. The 
importance of this “informal” channel as a resource for getting jobs has been 
documented by various surveys. It appears to be pervasive irrespective of the 
occupation or country. Ioannides and Loury (2004) provide a comprehensive overview 
of many of the literature findings. Bewley (1999, p. 368) gives a slightly older list of 
studies that were published between the years 1932-1990. The percent of jobs or job 
offers obtained through the informal channel of friends and relatives goes from 18% to 
78% (from 30 to 60% in most cases). In the following paragraphs, we focus on some 
recent articles that try to get at the exact channel of entry into jobs. 
Because of their diversity, we focus our discussion on contributions that look at   
questions also addressed in this paper. We distinguish between four types of issues. 
First, we will look at parents (own or classmates’) as a source of information about 
jobs. Indeed, a very active line of study investigates whether the neighborhood 
constitutes such a source of information and therefore tries to give a more precise 
content to “friends”. This informational aspect of location networks was used by Topa 
(2001) to explain the clustering of unemployment within Chicago neighborhoods. He 
adopted a probabilistic approach for the likelihood of a contact (which allows for 
“spillover” of information across census tracts). The recent work of Bayer, Ross, and 
Topa (2008) goes a step further and contributes to a better understanding of the referral 
aspect of networks again at this neighborhood level. Using micro-level census data for 
Boston, they find that those who live on the same block are more than 50% more likely   5 
to work together, than those living in nearby blocks. Munshi (2003) examines the role 
of the city of origin for Mexican immigrants but his data does not allow him to 
investigate the workplace. Laschever (2005) relies on the random assignment of 
American WWI veterans to military units. Using a small data set (n=1,295), he is able 
to show that an increase in peers’ unemployment decreases a veteran’s likelihood of 
employment. Laschever’s focus is identification of various peer effects. To perform his 
identification of peer effects, he contrasts two reference groups for each veteran: those 
who served with him at WWI and his closest neighbors (in terms of physical distance) 
at the 1930 Census. A new set of papers (Cingano and Rosolia, 2008 and Åslund, 
Hensvik and Skans, 2009, Dustmann, Glitz, and Schönberg, 2010 are three good 
examples) looks at matched longitudinal employer-employee data to follow workers 
who have worked in the same firm at some point in time and check if the characteristics 
(say, the geographic origin) of their network has an impact on job search or other 
outcomes. Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2011) use a novel source of information on 
individuals and their friends collected within a British panel (BHPS) to examine how 
friends’ employment affect individuals own employment. Finally, Corak and Piraino 
(2010) use data somewhat similar to ours but focus on intergenerational earnings 
mobility for men who have the same main employer as their fathers (but were not 
necessarily simultaneously employed at the same firm). By contrast with our analysis, 
their focus is clearly not on referral or networks at the moment of entry on the labor 
market. 
In contrast to most of these papers, we use extremely precise and error-free measures 
of family and class links between the informed (the child) and the informant (the father 
or the mother or the parents of the classmates). For all of them, we have virtually all 
information that one classically has in surveys, even though the data we use are 
administrative. Hence, these fathers and mothers are our equivalent to the neighborhood 
in Bayer et al.’s approach. Furthermore, again in contrast with most previous studies, 
we use an exhaustive sample of individuals. Our data allow us to follow all graduates 
who leave Swedish schools between 1988 and 1995 during a seven years period (i.e. 
until 2002 for the latest cohort). In addition, we can use data on any worker employed in 
the Swedish economy, even though we focus on those employed at plants in which the 
parents or the children also work. Thus, we can also look at differences in behavior 6   
between different parents working in the same firm or plant. In the spirit of Laschever, 
we define reference groups for each person for whom we examine entry in a first job – 
most often, students who graduate from the same classroom, i.e. in the same year, at the 
same school, in the same field of education – but our use of this reference group is 
different from his. A child and her parents in our strategy constitute the equivalent of 
Laschever’s or Bayer et al.’s reference groups (those with whom a person potentially 
works and gets job information from). Hence, every child in a classroom faces different 
information sets because of the privileged access each one has to his or her parents for 
the strong ties or to his or her classmates’ parents living or not in his/her neighborhood 
for the weak ties . Hence, we can use three types of variations to identify the effects of 
interest: on the child side (grades, sex, field of education); on the parent’s side (in 
particular, the parent’s plant characteristics and identifier, the parent’s sex, field of 
education, wage or tenure,…); on the classmate side (living in the same neighborhood 
or not, the employer identifier of the classmates’ parents). We believe that we are the 
first to look simultaneously at these different ties in any context (and not only at entry 
on the labor market). 
Second, we try to look at parents as a source of information on the quality of the 
applicants, inspired by a second line of study, mostly theoretical up to now, that insists 
on the role of networks in solving the adverse selection problem that firms face when 
selecting among job applications. For instance, Montgomery (1991) shows that referrals 
and networks help the firms to select workers when their type is not widely observable 
by the market. Other papers insist on this unobserved ability component of the referred 
individual. Empirically, very few articles have attacked this issue directly, at least to our 
knowledge. Again, in contrast with all previous studies, we directly measure some 
aspects of quality of the applicants. First, our data sources include national grades, for 
all compulsory school and high-school graduates (but not university graduates). 
Because we include all students in the same class, we are able to compute a relative 
measure of quality. Second, because we are able to track the exact plant at which young 
workers are employed, we measure outcomes (such as wages) relative to other new 
entrants or workers within the employing entity (using plant fixed effects). More 
precisely, we compare outcomes at the level of the plant where parents and children are   7 
working together, by looking at co-workers and new hires that entered this particular 
plant by channels other than “family hiring”.  
Third, and most unusually, because we identify the agent of the match (the parent or 
the classmates’ parents), we are able to describe the agent’s personal characteristics 
(wage, education) before entry of the child as well as potential changes in some 
elements after entry.  
Fourth, and finally, we examine how jobs obtained through family links unfold 
within the employing firm. In particular, we look at mid-term outcomes for the 
children, as well as for the parents. Interestingly, the within-plant relation may allow the 
firm to solve moral hazard problems (if the child does not provide enough effort, 
breaches the contract, or if the parent lied about the quality of the child) using potential 
punishments. In general, because we follow workers, parents as well as children, over 
time we are in a position to examine the mid-term outcomes for those who were hired 
by referral as well as for those who acted as referral and contrast them with those hired 
from the same class without a parent in the plant. We believe that we are the first 
analysts to look at this precise question in the job search context. There is another 
context, though, where this type of problems emerges: credit market failures in 
developing economies. Ghatak and Guinanne (1999), Ghatak (2000), and Conning 
(2005) look at microfinance when peers can monitor members of their social network. 
This reciprocal monitoring can facilitate credit access. Millo and Pasini (2007) presents 
a theoretical framework that helps understand how repeated interactions together with 
social networks help alleviate moral hazard in non-market insurance situations. All 
these papers may help us understand how the joint presence of a child and a parent 
in a plant may be useful for their employing firm. 
 Our findings can be summarized as follows:  
•  First, strong social ties in the form of family networks play an important role 
when young workers find their first jobs.
1 Specifically, for the average (across 
all education  levels) graduate the probability of entering a specific plant is 
estimated to increase by 8 percentage points if the father works there and by 6 
percentage points if the mother works there. Considering that we estimate the 
counterfactual probability of entering the same plants to be about half a percent, 
                                                 
1 Our analysis excludes self-employed parents. 8   
the estimates suggest a substantial role for strong social ties in the process of 
sorting youths over starting jobs. Conversely, a plant is more likely to hire one 
of his employees’ children than someone else from the same class, and the plant 
hires more graduates in the years when children of the employees enter the 
market.  
•  Second, the effects of strong social ties are more pronounced for children with 
poor labor market prospects, in particular those with low schooling and poor 
grades as well as in years of high unemployment. This holds also after 
accounting for characteristics of the parent, region and plant (of the parent). 
•  Third, the importance of weak ties is roughly independent of the level of 
schooling. The importance of ties strength therefore appears inversely related to 
the labor market prospects of the entering agent.  
•  Fourth, strong social ties matter more if the agent of the match (the parent) is 
well attached to the plant (the demand side). Specifically, networks matter more 
if the agent is a high-wage worker with relatively long tenure at the plant, even 
controlling for plant fixed effects. The effect is substantially weaker if the parent 
has left the plant, and (except for university graduates) at some other plant 
within the same firm. 
•  Fifth, similarity between the child and the parent reinforce the network effect, in 
particular fathers (mothers) matter more for sons (daughters) and the network 
effect is stronger when children have an education similar to that of their parents 
and when the industry of the parent is more relevant for the type of education the 
child has followed.
2  
•  Sixth, gender matters: boys follow parents more than girls and paternal links 
matter more than maternal links. The finding that networks matter more for 
males concur with results from previous research on weak ties (e.g. in Bayer et 
al, 2008), but a novel finding is that the gender effect on the demand side is 
primarily driven by the type of employing plant: within plants, the gender of the 
parent matters much less. On the supply (child) side, boys benefit from parental 
networks more than girls, even within plants.  
                                                 
2 This analysis accounts for the direct effect of similarity by using classmates whose parents also have the same type 
of education as their parents to estimate the counterfactual probability of entering the plant.    9 
•  Seventh, information appears to be a key driver of family network effects. 
Occupations in which parental hiring is widely used are those with many 
outgoing students and relatively broad scope of potential receiving firms in the 
municipality (not bakers or masons or any other craft but skilled metal workers 
or energy workers) together with a large number of potential employers in the 
municipality.  
•  Eighth, we show that the parent is indeed the agent of the match: a) the plant 
hires more graduates in the exact year in which an employee’s child graduates 
from school; b) wage growth of the parents whose children are recruited are 
higher than that of their coworkers before the time of recruitment, but becomes 
lower in the exact year the plants hire their children. 
•  Finally, when analyzing the consequences of parental networks for subsequent 
labor market outcomes we find that the initial wage paid to the child is lower 
than for equivalent persons entering the plant through other channels. However, 
this is partially compensated in the mid-term; these children spend longer spells 
in their first job than hires without a parent in the plant. For firms, parental 
hiring thus appears to be one way of reducing (young) workers subsequent 
turnover.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, section 2 discusses some 
elements of theory and the empirical model. Section 3 provides a brief background of 
Swedish institutions and the labor market conditions at the time of study. Section 4 
gives a detailed description of the used data and how it has been constructed. Section 5 
provides empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
2  Theory and empirical model 
2.1 Theory 
In this subsection, we briefly outline the potential roles of networks in labor markets. In 
particular, we try to focus on the specific role of parents, the strong ties, versus weaker 
ties, the classmates or the neighbors at the moment of entry onto the labor market. We 
examine in turn various functions. 10   
Strong ties and Weak ties: In a seminal contribution built on Granovetter (1973), 
Boorman (1975) models the time spent by a job searcher in maintaining respectively her 
strong and her weak ties. Without going deep into his model, Boorman assumes that 
strong ties take more time to maintain than weak ties. The tradeoff is therefore between 
a limited number of strong ties and a larger number of weak ties. Information from a 
social contact goes first to her strong ties, then if none or if all are already employed, to 
her weak ties. One clear consequence is that when unemployment is high or when the 
strong ties of some contact are more likely to be unemployed (because they have low-
education; for instance), information will not reach the weak ties. Conversely, strong 
ties are more helpful when unemployment is high or when the job searcher has low-
education.
3 Clearly, the number of weak and strong ties matters in this problem: a lower 
number of the former (at entry on the labor market, with no labor market experience one 
has few contacts) makes the strong ties relatively more useful. 
2.1.1  Roles of (parental) networks when searching for a job 
Informing the job searcher: In a situation where job openings are rare, dispersed, or 
difficult to locate, a job searcher will use family informants more intensively. In 
addition, networks may help the job searcher to learn about the quality of the jobs in the 
contact firms. This effect should be even stronger for young workers examined in this 
paper who generally have little first-hand knowledge of the labor market.  
Informing the firm about the job searcher’s quality: In this context, the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity and potential adverse selection may explain why firms use 
referring (Montgomery, 1991). For this line of research, quality of the applicants is what 
matters for the firm. However, other papers tend to emphasize the potential productivity 
mismatch in referral hiring (Bentolila, Michelacci, Suarez, 2010). In this case, referral 
hiring should be associated with lower wages for those hired through referrals than for 
those hired through normal channels.  
2.1.2  Holding a job with the help of a network 
In Montgomery (1991), workers who provide contacts should be high-ability workers, 
with longer tenures in the firm (allowing the firm to know workers’ ability). 
Furthermore, workers who are hired through referrals should be high-ability too, should 
                                                 
3 Jackson (2008) summarizes Boorman (1975) and shows the limits of this model. Still, given the empirical nature of 
our work, our short presentation is sufficient.    11 
be better compensated, and should also stay longer periods of time in the hiring firm. 
The analysis of outcomes beyond the moment of hiring for those workers, both 
informant and informed, within firms that use referrals is absent from this strand of the 
literature. However, the references mentioned above, from the development literature, 
show that moral hazard is a central issue resolved through delegated or peer monitoring. 
In our context, a similar solution can be found for three actions that are subject to moral 
hazard. First, the referral may have lied on the referred type (using Montgomery’s 
perspective). Second, more classically, the referred may not select the appropriate level 
of effort. In this last case, the referral provides a natural peer when implementing some 
form of monitoring.
4 Third, if turnover is costly, the referral might be expected to 
induce the referred worker to stay longer periods of time.
5 In all cases, punishment of 
the deviating individual remains an issue that we will try to address.  
2.2  Empirical models and identification strategies 
Our empirical models should help us understand how networks affect the search for the 
first stable job of new graduates. Here we describe the set-up for family networks but 
the  principles directing our analysis of classmates’ and neighbors’ networks are exactly 
similar. Because we try to capture causal effects of parental presence at a plant, we need 
an empirical model that accounts for the fact that there is a (counterfactual) probability 
that the graduate would have ended up in her parent’s plant, even if the parent had not 
worked there. We use classmates to construct such a counterfactual. Our empirical 
models should also help us understand the direct effect of “parental hiring”. First, we 
must measure the children outcomes and compare them with those that entered a given 
plant with no parent around. Second, we want to capture the impact on parents if 
“parental hiring” was not successful. In addition, we want to apportion the role of the 
respective characteristics of the student, of the parents, of the plant of the parents, of the 
children and parents fields of study and occupations, and of labor market conditions but 
we leave the description of that extension to the empirical part of the paper. Below we 
present the details of our empirical models, starting with the basic model that will help 
us assess the existence and the magnitude of parental networks in hiring.  
                                                 
4 For instance, Millo and Pasini (2007) mix Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), who study the effect of the presence of non-
market insurance on market insurance when moral hazard is a concern, with Vega-Redondo (2006), who looks at 
stability in social networks. They show that more cohesive networks allow for a better control of moral hazard. 
5 Discouraging turnover could also be modeled using Montgomery’s model if the types are not low versus high 
quality but low versus high mobility. 12   
2.2.1 The  set-up 
Whether a high-school or university graduate finds her first stable job in a particular 
firm depends on how well her skills and social networks overlap with those needed by 
the firm. In order to estimate the effects of a particular network (in our case provided by 
the parents-children relations), we need a model which accounts for all potential sources 
of overlap between skills of the graduate and characteristics and needs of the firm.  
Consider a set of graduates, indexed by i, each graduating from a particular class, c(i). 
The class defines a specific location (school), a time (year of graduation) and an 
occupation (the specifics of the education, the field of study). Each graduate may start 
working in any of the plants (indexed by j) present in the economy. Using a formulation 
similar to Kramarz and Thesmar (2011), we analyze the following linear model for the 
probability that graduate i starts working in plant j: 
 
(1)   j i j i j i c j i c i A E , , ), ( ), ( , ε γ β + + = , 
 
where  j i c i E ), ( ,  is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual i from class c(i), 
starts working in plant j.  j i A ,  is an indicator variable capturing whether a parent of the 
graduating student i works in plant j,  j i c ), ( β   is a match effect that captures the 
propensity that graduates from a given class may end up working in a particular plant 
(skills, size,…). In this model, because we control for the match specific effect just 
described, our parameter of interest measuring the network effect is captured byγ . For 
now, we assume that γ  is a constant, but in the results section, we present useful 
extensions. Finally, the error termε  captures all other factors within a class that affects 
the probability that graduate i  starts working in plant j. We assume that 
0 ) ) ( , ( , , = × j i c A E j i j i ε  where the product between c(i) and j captures the controls for 
the interaction between the class and the plant effects. 
If  ε  and A are orthogonal given the class-plant fixed effects β  as assumed just 
above, we are, in theory, able to obtain a consistent estimate of γ . The practical 
problem of estimating equation (1) is however non-trivial. Estimation of (1) as such 
would require a data set with one observation for each combination of individual and 
plant. As our data set contain over 600,000 graduates and over 300,000 plants per year,   13 
estimation of such a model would therefore require construction of a data set with 
nearly 200 billion observations. 
In practice we estimate two transformations of equation (1), based on two identification 
strategies. The first transformation results in a within-class model where we compare 
the average hiring probabilities of linked (A=1) and unlinked (A=0) graduates by class-
plant combination. The second transformation assumes that the class-plant effect (β) is 
constant over time which allows us to estimate a plant level timing model. The model 
compares the plant’s probability of hiring workers from the (time-constant) “class type” 
(a school-field of study combination) before and after the graduation of a linked child 
(i.e. with a parent in the plant). 
2.2.2  Identification using within-class comparisons 
In order to transform equation (1) into an estimable model, we use a methodology 
invented by Kramarz and Thesmar (2011). First, we restrict the sample under study to 
cases where there is within plant-class variation in A. Hence, we exclude plant-class 
combinations in which no parent of the class’s graduates are employed as well as 
classes where all parents work in the same plant. However, this is not sufficient to make 
the model estimable. We thus aggregate the model by computing, for each plant-class 
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In words, equation (2) relates the fraction of graduates from class c with parents in plant 
j  who were hired by this particular plant to parameters of equation (1). However, 
because the match specific effect  j i c ), ( β  is still present in the equation, the model is still 
not estimable. Therefore, we now calculate the corresponding ratio for graduates from 
each class hired by a plant in which none of their parents is working. Note that because 14   
of our sample restriction, it implies that at least one student from the same class has a 
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Thus, taking the difference between the two ratios eliminates the plant-class fixed 
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original error term is uncorrelated with A. 
The variable G is computed for each plant-class combination as the fraction of those 
hired in the plant from the class among those with a parent in a plant minus the fraction 
of those hired in the plant from the same class among those without a parent in the 
plant.
7 It is worth stressing that G  is computed as the difference between two 
probabilities: working in a specific plant for those with a parent in the plant and 
working in the same plant for those without a parent there. Conceptually this 
computation is very close to, but more efficient than, taking the difference in hiring 
probabilities between pairs in the same class where one has a parent in the plant and the 
other not.
8  
                                                 
6 Note that the restrictions we use imply that we drop plants where no parents work. Given our very broad data set 
(described below) we do however keep observations describing a very large part of the labor market. In total we have 
observations from 150,000 establishments (see Table 6b below) which is about half of all establishments in the 
economy. In addition, since the sample is drawn on the employee side, lost establishments are typically very small. 
7 When estimating (3) we weight all regressions by the number of parents (from the class) in each plant in order to get 
representative estimates, but this weighting is not essential since it is rare that several graduates from the same class 
have parents in the same plant. 
8 Melissa Tartari, in a discussion of our paper, rightly suggested that looking at pairs of classmates with one parent 
working in a plant, when the other parent does not, suffices for estimatingγ . Other transformations of the data that 
allows identification and estimation of γ  must exist; we do not investigate them here.   15 
Estimating γ  from G allows us to answer the question “how much more likely is the 
average plant to hire a child of one of its employees than someone else from the child’s 
class?” Equivalently it answers the question “how much more likely is it for a graduate 
of a given class to start working in a plant where her parents are employed than it is for 
her classmates?”. Note that both of these questions refer to the importance of existing 
links, i.e. the estimates are defined for graduates with employed parents and, 
equivalently, for plants with (parental) links to graduates.  
(At least) two main objections can be raised to the above identification strategy. 
First, classmates may not be a valid control group. Our estimates will be biased if a 
worker with a parent in a plant would have had a higher probability than his classmates 
of working in the plant even if the parent had not worked there. Second, there may be 
“crowding-out” of classmates in their hiring probabilities. If there is competition over 
vacancies, when someone in a class has a parent in a specific plant, the probability of 
working there for classmates without a parent in the plant may well be reduced. Both of 
these possible concerns will lead us to overestimate the importance of family networks. 
We will return to these questions in the empirical section, discuss them extensively, and 
present various robustness checks within this framework to assess their importance.  
2.2.3  Identification using the timing of graduation 
An alternative identification strategy relies on the following idea. When a student 
graduates in a given year, for the plant that employs his/her parent this event constitutes 
a potential exogenous supply shock directed to this specific plant in this specific year. 
We rely on this variation to estimate a model that relates the plant’s recruitments of any 
worker (resembling the child of an employee) to the timing of the child’s graduation. In 
this case, we define the type of worker by the combination of school and field (but, 
obviously not the year of graduation). We then calculate for each year (going from 5 
years before to 5 years after graduation) the fraction of graduates (of the type) who enter 
the linked plant.  
Essentially, we think of the graduation year of the child as creating an idiosyncratic 
link between the plant where the parent works and the type of worker defined by the 
child’s characteristics. In this alternative strategy, we ask whether this new link affects 
actual recruitments or not. More precisely, it measures whether firms hire a larger 
fraction of the available workers with a given set of characteristics at the moment of 16   
graduation of an employee’s child (endowed with these characteristics), rather than 
before.   
3 Institutional  background   
3.1  The Swedish educational system 
The Swedish educational system is tuition-free at all levels. Children are, with few 
exceptions, required to start school in August during their 7
th year and attend 9 years of 
compulsory schooling. After finishing 9
th grade (during their 16
th year) most students 
choose to start high-school and about 85 percent of a cohort graduates.  
High school students are enrolled in one of several possible “programs”. Admissions 
to the programs are based on the compulsory school grade point average (GPA) 
whenever there are more applicants than can be admitted. Programs are either 
“Academic” or “Vocational”. Academic programs provide general education with some 
(broad) specialization such as “Science” or “Social Sciences” whereas Vocational 
programs provided specific training into occupations through programs such as the 
Construction worker program or the Office assistant program. Up to 1994, Academic 
programs could either be 2 or 3 years long (with a 4-years version for engineers) 
whereas vocational programs were 2-years long. All students from the academic 
programs but, in general not those from the short vocational programs, were eligible for 
university admission. Due to a reform of the vocational programs in 1994, all Swedish 
high school students graduating after 1994 receive a 3 years long education that 
qualifies for university studies. However, the transition rates from vocational programs 
to higher education remain very low. 
3.2  The business cycle 
Our period under study goes from 1988 to 2002. This includes the most turbulent period 
ever faced by the Swedish labor market since the 1930s. The unemployment rate which 
had been below 5 % since the 1960s (and was below 2 % in the late 1980s) suddenly 
increased to 9.5 % in the early 1990s (see Figure 1).
9 The unemployment rate remained 
high until the late 1990s when it started to decline and by the year 2001 the 
unemployment rate had reached 5 % again. Youth unemployment showed a similar time 
                                                 
9 The recession started with the adverse effects of high inflation combined with a fixed exchange rate. It was 
accompanied by high interest rates, a rapid fall in private spending due to a tax reform, and a collapsing real estate 
market. Starting in 1993 there was also a large reduction in public sector employment (see e.g. Holmlund, 2006).   17 
pattern. The 1990s also saw a rapid expansion of the proportion of the working-age 
population enrolled in some form of education. Upper secondary education was 
prolonged for students on vocational programs and the number of students in tertiary 
education was dramatically increased. As a result, the employment to population ratio 
did not recover as much as the unemployment rate after the recession, the difference 
















1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Time
Unemployment rate 15-24 Unemployment rate 15-64
Source: OECD
 
Figure 1 Unemployment 1985–2002 
 
4  Data and description 
The paper makes use of a wide range of Swedish population-wide data sources 
combined in the “IFAU database”. Part of the data comes from a linked employer-
employee data set covering the entire Swedish economy between 1985 and 2002. In 
addition, the paper uses links between children and their biological parents. 
Furthermore, we use detailed information from graduation records stemming from 
different levels of schooling. These records contain information, not only on the exact 
type of education, but also give details on the exact school at which graduation took 
place. Combining these various data sources into a working data set is a complex 18   
procedure. Appendix A provides a fairly detailed overview of the procedure we used in 
creating our final data set.  
4.1  Establishment and parental link data 
4.1.1 Establishment  data 
The linked employer-employee part of the data set is originally based on tax records 
filed by firms and collected by Statistics Sweden.
10 The data contain annual information 
on all 16–65 year-old employees receiving remuneration from Swedish employers (both 
private and public) between 1985 and 2002. These annual data sets contain information 
on each individual’s earnings received from each single employer as well as the first 
and last remunerated month during the year. We use these data to find each workers 
primary job in February each year. The job is defined by a wage and a plant.
11  
 
Throughout the analysis we exclude workers in the agricultural-forestry sector and 
children of self employed parents. These restrictions are however not essential for any 
of the results.   
We link basic demographic characteristics to the data set. These include gender, age, 
level of completed education, and country of birth as well as an indicator of whether a 
person is self-employed or not. We calculate plant size as the number employees and 
construct variables capturing average wage and the fraction of employees having 
various characteristics within each plant. Wages are deflated by the average wage 
within the sample for that year to account for both inflation and real wage growth. 
Tenure is calculated as the number of consecutive years (since 1985 at most) that the 
person has worked in the same plant. We further add some generic plant characteristics 
such as county of the plant (there are 24 counties in Sweden), industry (38 two-digit 
codes and 9 one-digit codes)
12 and sector (private or public). For each two-digit industry 
we calculate an employment based Herfindahl-index (H)
13 measuring the lack of 
dispersion as a distance between zero and one, where one corresponds to a situation 
                                                 
10 Statistics Sweden refers to this data base as RAMS. 
11 We refer to all establishments as “plants”. 
12 Due to a change in the industry classification system in 1992 this “reduced” two-digit level is the finest level at 
which we can have consistent industry codes over the period. 
13 Calculated as the sum of squared employment shares in each plant (j) which captures the level of competition by 
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with one dominant plant and zero corresponds to a situation with an infinite number of 
plants, each with an infinitesimal market share. 
4.1.2 Parent-child  links 
The overall data set contains links between all parents and children present in the data 
set. The information is based on registers of legal parents, thus the links are between 
children and their biological parents or if applicable, their adoptive parents. Missing 
values are rare (less than 3 percent in the various samples, see table A1) mainly occur 
either if the parent was older than 65 already in 1985 or did not reside in Sweden at all 
during 1985-2002. There are also a (very) small number of “father-unknown” cases.  
4.1.3  Description: Parent-establishment links in the overall data 
Here we describe the pattern of parent-child joint employment that can be found in the 
overall establishment data. We use the information on employment that was described 
above and add links between parents and children as well as basic demographic 
characteristics. We restrict the description to parent-child pairs in which both parties are 
employed. Furthermore, we only include cases where the children are aged 40 or below. 
The first column of Table 1 shows descriptive regressions on the probability of at least 
one parent employed at the plant if at least one of them is employed using data for 2002. 
The second and third columns show regressions for the probability of having the mother 
and father respectively employed at the plant if the relevant parent also is employed. 
The last column shows regressions for having both parents in the plant if both are 
employed.  
The results show that being male, young, low educated and living in a rural area 
makes it more likely that a person is working with his parents. Differences between 
immigrants and Swedish born are only minor although the estimate is imprecise due to 
the fact that too few foreign born employees have parents that are employed (in 
Sweden). Figure 2 shows the time pattern from 1985 onwards using the 1985 
distribution of age, gender, education, immigration status and type of region as weights 
in order to purge the time pattern of changes in individual characteristics. We find little 
evidence of trends, but a clear cyclical pattern with a much higher frequency of working 
together during the high unemployment years (i.e. 1993-1998, see Figure 1 above). 
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Table 1 Probability of having parent(s) at the workplace 
   Any Father  Mother  Both 
Male 0.032**  0.056**  -0.015**  0.009** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Young 0.018**  0.005**  0.011**  -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Old 0.004**  0.005**  0.003**  0.004** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
LowEd 0.063**  0.048**  0.033**  0.017** 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
HighEd -0.064**  -0.048**  -0.028**  -0.013** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Immigrant -0.005*  -0.005*  0.004*  0.004** 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Metro -0.028**  -0.021**  -0.011**  -0.004** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.104**  0.060**  0.062**  0.018** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Observations 384,858  384,858  384,858  384,858 
R-squared 0.03  0.03  0.01  0.01 
Note: Linear probability model estimates for working with parent(s) in a specific plant if employed and 
the parent(s) is (are) employed. Data is for 2002. Population only includes (children) aged 40 or younger. 




















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2002
Year
Working with any parent Working with mother
Working with father Working with both parents
Note: Included if younger than 40, working in specified plant and parent(s) is(are) empoyed
Weights are calculated according to cells defined by the interaction of gender, age (3 groups), education,
immigration status and type of region
 
Figure 2 Time pattern of fractions working with parents, weighted by 1985 
characteristics. 
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Although this description is suggestive, it has its limitations in terms of 
understanding network effects. These limitations highlight why our identification 
strategy is useful: from these statistics we cannot know if parents work with children 
because they are similar (e.g. in terms of education and where they live) or because of 
the existence of networks. Even if we could, we would not be able to differentiate 
between the supply and demand sides of the market since we do not know who hired 
whom. Our solutions to these problems are to focus our main analysis on graduates’ 
first jobs and to make the within-class and timing comparisons outlined in Section 2. 
4.2  Graduation data and first stable jobs 
4.2.1  The population of interest  
Our population of interest is constructed from graduation records from all three major 
levels of schooling in the Swedish system (see Section 3 for details on the schooling 
system): We use data on all individuals graduating from Compulsory schools (9 years of 
schooling), High Schools (11, 12 or 13 years) or Universities (15 years or more) during 
1988 to 1995. 
We study four different populations defined by their educational attainment:  
1.  Compulsory schooling includes individuals who completed compulsory 
schooling but did not complete high school.  
2.  Vocational high school includes individuals who completed a two or three year 
vocational high school education before age 21 without proceeding to university 
before finding a first stable job.  
3.  Academic high school includes individuals that completed a two, three or four 
year long academic high school program before age 21 and who do not proceed 
to university before finding a first stable job.  
4.  University includes graduates from a university (college) education that is at 
least 3 year long. Only those graduating before age 30 are included. This sample 
also includes graduates from various post high school educations within health 
care (if they are at least three years long) such as nursing school graduates.  
4.2.2 Defining  classes and classmates 
Our identification strategy essentially builds on comparisons between graduates coming 
from the same school, graduating at the same time, and within the same field of 
education. We refer to the combination of school, graduation time, and field as a 22   
“class”. Even though this measure does not necessarily correspond to an exact class as 
such, the definition serves our purposes well since we mainly use the concept of a class 
to control for factors that are time, region and occupation specific (how this is done was 
explained in section 3 above) and we do not mainly use the concept to capture social 
interactions between classmates.
14 In Appendix A we explain in detail how the class 
concepts are defined for each of the four different groups of graduates. 
4.2.3  Other educational variables 
Apart from basic demographic characteristics, data contain information on grade point 
average (GPA) for compulsory school graduates and the two sets of high school 
graduates. Each grade is set on a scale of 1 to 5 by the teacher (in some cases with the 
help of nation-wide tests) so that grades should have a national average of 3 and a 
standard deviation of 1. 
We further construct two key variables describing the similarity between the education 
of a graduate and the education of his or her parent and the industry of the parent: First, 
we construct an indicator equal to 1 when the graduate and the parent share the same 1-
digit field of education (irrespective of level). Second, for each type of education (field 
and level), but over all schools and years, we measure the fraction of graduates finding a 
job in each of the 38 different industries. This measure of average education-industry 
flows is used to capture how relevant an industry is for a graduate with a specific 
education. This measure is then used to quantify how expected or unexpected is a 
graduate’s choice of industry, given his or her education. 
4.2.4 Neighborhoods 
Our data on neighborhoods are based on Statistics Sweden’s definition of SAMS (Small 
Area Market Statistics) which refers to a homogeneous neighborhood in terms of 
building structures (not resident characteristics). The median resident has 450 working 
age neighbors within his or her SAMS.  
4.2.5  Definition of the first stable job 
In order to study parental networks and their role for children’s labor market insertion, 
we need to define what “real” or stable jobs are, in particular in contrast to those jobs 
held when at school (for which parents are likely to help even more). For this reason, 
                                                 
14 Although we do discuss robustness checks where we try to account for the possibility of such effects, through 
friendship networks.   23 
we define a “stable job” as a job which lasts for at least 4 months during a calendar year 
and which produces total (annual) earnings of (at least) 3 times an average janitor’s 
wage which we use as a proxy for a “minimum wage” (Sweden have no legislated 
minimum wage). As shown in the Data Appendix (Table A3) 53 percent of graduates 
satisfy these criteria the year after graduation. 
Figure 3 shows the time elapsed in order to find a first stable job for the different 
types of educational attainment. The figure clearly highlights that there are large 
differences between the different samples. It is clear that it takes a substantial amount of 
time before Compulsory school graduates finds their first stable job, whereas University 
graduates in general find jobs very shortly after graduation. When analyzing the time 
pattern we found, unsurprisingly, that the negative labor market shocks in the early to 
mid 1990s coincides with an increased duration between graduation and work, in 






















































Note: Percentages are for the fraction having received a first job by year since graduation
 
Figure 3 Time to first stable job – cumulative 
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Appendix A provides descriptive statistics. Table A1 describes children and parents 
in the four education groups where parents’ characteristics are computed conditional on 
employment. Table A2 describes the construction on data on jobs held by parents. Table 
A3 presents statistics for the creation of the graduates’ first stable jobs. When 
estimating equation (6) we transform the data according to our empirical model and 
Table A4 shows descriptive statistics for these transformed data for all the variables 
used in our heterogeneity regressions.  
5 Results 
5.1  Using within-class variations – how important are parents? 
In this section we estimate the probability that the first stable job is found at the plant of 
the parent using equation (3). The parental hiring effect (γ) we estimate captures the 
excess probability a graduate has to find her first stable job at the parent’s plant after 
removing a specific effect capturing the interaction of the exact education, location, 
time of graduation (the class, to summarize), year of the first stable job, and the hiring 
plant since comparisons are made within the combination of class, year of first job, and 
plant. As mentioned above, self employed parents and parents in the agricultural-
forestry sector are excluded throughout.  
Table 2 presents the estimation results. We present estimates of γ for mothers and 
fathers separately, respectively in the first panel and in the second panel. Each column 
presents separate estimates for the four education groups. Finally, for each panel, we 
present estimation results for children of both sexes jointly, as well as for male and 
female children separately.  
All estimates are strongly positive and significant. Hence, graduating students are 
much more likely than their classmates to go in the plant where one of their parents is 
employed. It should be noted already at this stage that the estimates of the model, in 
general, are very close to the raw mean probabilities for starting to work in the parents 
plant, in other words the counterfactual probability of working in the specific plant is 
very low (estimated to be around half a percent).
15 This is highlighted in Table A5 in 
Appendix A, where we also show the different components leading up to the estimates.   
                                                 
15 To understand this, notice that it is essentially impossible to predict the employing plant of any graduate so the 
baseline probabilities captured by the fixed effects in equation (1) are very small, at least compared to the estimates   25 
Table 2 Parental networks effect on probability of finding the first job in a specific plant, 
baseline within-class estimates 













  0.104 0.081 0.095  0.020  0.076 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
N  46,872 151,208  124,279  85,366  407,725 
Males 
 
  0.142 0.117 0.129  0.033  0.110 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N  23,106 84,797 56,842  31,560  196,305 
Females 
 
  0.052 0.033 0.064  0.011  0.039 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 




  0.079 0.057 0.068  0.020  0.055 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
N  47,374 149,733  127,387  94,940  419,434 
Males 
  0.063 0.044 0.061  0.014  0.046 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
N  23,187 84,341 58,152  35,358  201,038 
Females 
 
  0.097 0.074 0.074  0.023  0.062 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N 
16,456 60,059 62,927  55,608  195,050 
Note: Estimates of parental network effects. An observation is a combination of class, plant, and year of first job. 
Weighted by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 findning a stable 
job within 7 years of graduation. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for dependencies within class. **Significant at 
the 1 % level. 
 
The estimated network effect is particularly strong for the low educated. As an 
example, the estimates for graduates who enter the labor market without any post-
compulsory school education suggest that the probability of working in a specific plant 
is increased by 8 percentage points by the mere fact that the mother works there. The 
corresponding estimate for the plant where the father works is 10 percentage points. The 
effect is also quite large for students graduating from Vocational or Academic high-
schools. It is much lower though for students graduating from the university (at the 
                                                                                                                                               
of interest: the average plant has about 50 employees, thus, starting to work in any particular plant is very rare. 
Fortunately, our empirical model gives us the tools to compare the realized and counterfactual outcomes in this type 
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undergraduate or at the graduate level). And, strikingly, fathers tend to “hire” their sons 
when mothers tend to “hire” their daughters, even though the latter happens with a 
lower intensity.  
Table B1 presents similar results for each year after graduation. Hence, the first 
column shows results in the graduation year. Then, results for one year, two years, or 
more, after graduation are given in the next columns. Again results are presented for 
mothers and fathers separately as well as by education group. It is important to 
remember that each child is present only once in the analysis. Hence, for example, 
estimates shown in column “t=1” are obtained for those children who find a job one 
year after graduation. The comparison group is made up of classmates who find a job 
after the same number of years. Results show that the effect is stronger just after 
graduation for most groups (see in particular those graduating from compulsory 
schools). It is slowly decaying afterwards, never disappearing even after seven years. 
However, clear exceptions are children graduating from vocational high-school, who 
have roughly the same likelihood of finding their first job in a plant where their father 
works just after graduation or three years after graduation. In addition, and not 
surprisingly, the number of children who find a job in more than 2 or 3 years after 
graduation is small for all groups but the low-education (with only compulsory 
schooling).  
5.2 Robustness  checks 
We have performed a variety of robustness checks, in particular in order to examine 
how results are affected by some of our initial modeling choices. All the detailed results 
described in this subsection are either presented in Table 3, in Appendix B, or are 
available upon request. 
First, we performed sensitivity tests in order to assess the quality of our main 
identifying assumption that classmates are a valid control group. The consistency of the 
estimates relies on the assumption that there is no unobserved factor which makes a 
child more likely to work in the same plant as her father or mother (in comparison with 
other students in her class) other than the parent working there. Such a factor could be 
an unobserved taste for that particular plant. This is indeed difficult to test. As an 
attempt to falsify the assumption we did three different robustness checks: We 
partitioned each class by the industry in which their parents worked so that we only   27 
compared one graduate to other graduates with parents  employed in similar (same 
industry), but not identical, plants. The results are essentially similar to, albeit a little 
smaller than, the results presented above (Table 3). We then performed the same 
analysis by partitioning the class according to the industry the graduate ends up in and 
again the results (Table 3) are very similar to the ones presented in Table 2. This shows 
that graduates end up in their parents’ plants more often than other graduates from the 
same class who start working in similar (same industry), but not identical, plants. Third, 
the taste for a particular plant may reveal a common taste or skill shared by the parent 
and the child, denoted αi. Its presence would bias our above estimates since it would be 
correlated with Ai,j and included in the residual εi,j without any way of controlling for it. 
In particular, our within-class-plant transformation which leads to equation (3) does not 
eliminate it as soon as some students in the class share such a taste with their parent 
when others do not. Hence, one strategy is to restrict attention to those students that are 
most likely to share this taste. Therefore, we re-estimated equation (3) but we only 
included graduates who had the exact same education as their parent.
 16 We perform 
this test for three levels of aggregation of education categories, 1-digit, 2-digits, and 3-
digits. Results are presented in the Appendix Table B2. Again, we find extremely 
similar results, with slightly larger estimated effects, and a little less precise when we 
use 3-digits education categories.
17 Because we only have children who share some αi 
component with their parents, the quasi-differencing procedure embedded in equation 
(3) should eliminate the bias. Overall, these results suggest that the estimated effect is 
not strongly sensitive to diverging preferences over types of firms within a class.  
                                                 
16 We thank Raquel Fernandez and Daron Acemoglu for suggesting this procedure.  
17 Using a 3-digits match reduces the sample considerably so in this specification we did not condition on the school, 
but instead used graduates from the same education, the same municipality (except university sample), and the same 
year. 28   
Table 3 Parental networks effect on probability of finding the first job in a specific plant, 
robustness of within-class model 
   Baseline estimates  Only classmates with 
parents in same 
industry 
Only classmates with 
parents in same 
industry and within-
firm wage quartile 
Only classmates going 




  0.076 0.065  0.065  0.044 
(s.e.)  (0.000)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N  407,725  123,458 50,262 202,293 
Mothers 
 
  0.055 0.041  0.040  0.043 
(s.e.)  (0.000)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N 
419,434  196,825 97,546 210,017 
   Firm hires 1 worker  Firm hires 2-5 workers Firm hires 6-10 
workers 




  0.094 0.087  0.064  0.078 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
N  17,001 50,206  24,664 148,223 
Mothers 
 
  0.056 0.050  0.041  0.065 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N 
14,022 56,634  32,002 163,785 
   Private plants  Firm level analysis 
(only private) 
Old (t-3) plant of 
parent 
Old (t-3) plant of 




  0.099 0.104  0.016  0.025 
(s.e.) 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.000)**  (0.001)** 
N  264,916 258,386  78,468  42,969 
Mothers 
 
  0.103 0.108  0.014  0.023 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.000)**  (0.001)** 
N  146,861 142,915  88,136  47,180 
Note: Estimates of parental network effects. An observation is a combination of class, plant, and year of 
first job. Weighted by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-
1995 findning a stable job within 7 years of graduation. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for 
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Restricting attention to children with the exact same education as their parent tries to 
capture the idea that children may be better informed of certain job characteristics 
thanks to the occupations of their parents. This analysis shuts down such “supply side” 
explanations since all children in a class with the exact same education as their parents 
are on equal footing. We would also like to analyze situations where parents have the 
same positions within the firms but our data lack information about occupations. 
Therefore, we instead measured the effects within groups of parents with similar 
positions by dividing each class by the 2-digit industry and the within-firm wage 
quartile of the parents’ firm and re-estimated our equation. The results, presented in 
Table 3 (first panel, third column), show absolutely no change in the estimated effects. 
Hence, when we compare the role of parents with similar positions in similar firms, 
network effects are again present.  
Second, our identification rests on the assumption that classmates provide a valid 
control group for each graduate. But, if vacancies are rationed, it is possible that a 
worker who gets hired by a parent “takes” a vacancy away from the classmates. If this 
happens our estimates will be upward biased. To see this, let us rewrite equation (1) 
with the possibility that classmates are potential competitors for the same job: 
 
j i j i j i j i c j i c i A A E , , , ), ( ), ( ,
~ ε γ γ β + + + = −  
 
where A-i,j denotes parental employment for all other children in the class in this plant j. 
Then, taking first difference, between two classmates, i and i’, yields  
 
j i j i j i j i j i j i j i c i j i c i A A A A E E , ' , , ' , , ' , ), ' ( , ' ), ( , ) ( ~ ) ( ε ε γ γ − + − + − = − − −  
 
Assuming that only two pupils belong to the class, with i having a parent in j, whereas i’ 
does not, then the two variables,  ) (   and   ) ( , ' , , ' , j i j i j i j i A A A A − − − −  are negatively 
correlated, with correlation -1. Hence, our estimation would yield  γ γ ~ −  rather than γ. 
Given that γ ~is likely to be negative because of this crowding-out effect due to limited 
vacancies, then our estimate would be biased upwards. 30   
However, this effect is likely to be small. Indeed, as seen above, the parental hiring 
effect is sizeable but not huge, and the “crowding out” of classmates employment 
probabilities should be shared by all the classmates. Hence, the effect per classmate 
should therefore be very small. We have nevertheless performed three sets of robustness 
checks to see if this conjecture holds. First, we have estimated a separate effect in the 
(few) cases when there is more than one parent from a particular class in a given plant. 
The effect (unreported, but available upon request) is very similar to our main estimates 
suggesting that different graduates with parents in the same plant do not decrease each 
others’ probabilities of being hired. Second, we have estimated the model separately by 
total numbers of hires (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11 or more) made by the plant in the relevant year. 
Results are shown in Table 3, second panel. Here, if there is “crowding out”, the effect 
should be strong for plants that only hire a unique person – whereas crowding out 
should be less of a problem if many new employees are hired. The estimates for plants 
that hire a unique worker are slightly larger than for those hiring 2 to 5 or 6 to 10 
workers, but are essentially similar to the estimates for those plants hiring more than 11 
workers. In addition, we re-estimated the model of equation (3) relaxing the definition 
of the comparison group, using either graduates from other years, or graduates from 
other schools in the same municipality (except for university) but in the same year. The 
(unreported, again available) results were essentially unchanged.  
Third, the estimates we present are based on plant-level data. It is however possible 
that some parents not only help their children to enter their own plant but also other 
plants within the same firm. This could be particularly true for the highly educated (for 
instance, someone trained in law might not find an appropriate job in the local plant 
where her parents work but in the main office). In order to study the effects at the firm 
level, we need to restrict the analysis to the private sector. Looking at private plants 
increases the estimates quite a lot because the use of networks is much more limited in 
the public sector (as will be shown in the following section). The correction is 
especially important for mothers who more often than fathers work in the public 
sector.
18 Now, changing our unit of analysis (from plant to firm), given that we only 
examine the private sector, leaves the estimates essentially unchanged (Table 3, last 
panel). The difference in estimates between the plant and the firm specifications is less 
                                                 
18 We show below that the there are no gender differences in the use of referrals if one accounts for the characteristics 
of the plant of the parent.   31 
than 1 percent (less than 0.5 percent for the university sample), suggesting that parental 
hiring is mostly performed at the plant, rather than at the firm. This is true for all 
educational levels.  
Fourth, we changed the definition of the timing  to the first job.
19 Our baseline 
specification compares all those within a class who find a job within the same year, in 
order to be sure that our results are not driven by time effects or differences in overall 
hiring probabilities. Changing the definition and extending the comparison group to 
involve all graduates who find a first job at some point during the 7 years following 
graduation, rather than using only those finding a job in the same year, does not alter 
our results (unreported, available upon request).  
Fifth, we have looked at the probability of being hired in a plant where the parent 
used to work rather than where the parent is currently working. We took all the cases 
where the parent was employed by a different plant three years before the year under 
consideration, the plant still existed, and the plant hired at least someone (not 
necessarily a graduate). Results are shown in Table 3, third panel - columns 3 and 4 - 
for different conditioning sets (results by education are not reported but are available 
upon request). We find some evidence that the effects remain after the parent has left 
the plant but the magnitudes of these effects are, in all cases but one (unreported, again 
available), considerably smaller than the effects when the parent is still present. The one 
exception is the university sample. In this case the effect is nearly as large when the 
parent has left the plant as when the parent was present.  
Sixth, we have looked at various sub-samples, dividing the data according to various 
specificities of the parents’ educational fields and industries. We find in particular that 
parents in fields (narrowly defined at a three digit level) which have become obsolete 
(defined as having more than twice as many parents than children) do not, on average, 
help children more or less than parents in fields that are still expanding (unreported but 
available).  
Seventh, we changed the control group to only include classmates living in the same 
neighborhood, and/or with parents living in the same neighborhood. Naturally this 
reduced the sample dramatically for the university sample. The estimates found in 
                                                 
19 In fact, we performed an even more basic robustness check before this one. We randomly allocated parents and 
children within a class and re-estimated our model. All coefficients in the specifications presented in Table 2 were 
equal to zero.  32   
Table B3 in the appendix are, on average, reduced by a very small amount, but the 
pattern is stable cross educational levels. We have experimented with various models 
accounting for sorting over places residence and/or location of the parent’s place of 
work but the results are remarkably robust. We return to models estimating the impact 
of residential proximity in the weak tie analysis below. 
Eighth, we looked at siblings (i.e. brothers and sisters) and found that the presence 
of a sibling at a firm hiring one of our graduates is low, around 3.1% in the first job (for 
parents, the proportion is 6.7%, Table A4, first row). We will return to the impact of 
siblings in our analysis of later outcomes. 
5.3  Do employee-graduate links affect plant-level hiring? The timing model 
The timing model offers a different identification strategy for our effects of interest. It 
also allows us to further address concerns about crowding-out or spill-over effects 
between students in the same class. As described in Section 2, the timing model focuses 
on plants’ recruitments before and after graduation of a child linked to an employee (a 
father or a mother) at the plant. We use data on all graduates from the same school and 
type of education as that of an employee’s child, and look at recruitments before and 
after the graduation year of the child.
20 Identification here relies on within-plant 
variation over time for graduates of a given school and field across the years (by 
contrast with the time varying-definition of a class used in the previous model). Figure 4 
shows the probability of hiring a graduate of the same type as the graduating child over 
time before and after the graduation year. Results presented in Table 4 give the precise 
numbers and standard errors. This hiring probability is low and stable before the 
graduation of the linked child, but then increases dramatically at graduation and 
subsequently declines. Indeed, a gradual decline after the graduation year is what we 
should expect since not all graduates find their first job immediately. As shown in 
Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B, the rate of decline is rapid for university graduates 
(who find jobs fast, as indicated by Figure 3 above) and slow for compulsory school 
graduates (who find jobs slowly).  
The models we estimate here include the full effect of the link, which include any 
within-class spill-over or crowding-out effects. But the strategy may be affected by 
                                                 
20 For reasons of computational convenience we exclude the few cases where there are multiple years during our 
sample period where links are created between the same type of class and plant.   33 
inter-temporal substitution if plants postpone recruitments until a linked worker’s child 
graduates. However, the fact that there is no visible (or statistically significant) decline 
over time before graduation suggests that inter-temporal crowding out is not an 
important phenomenon unless plants are willing to postpone recruitments a full five 
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Table 4  Parental links and plant level hiring 
   Fraction of graduates 
"at risk" hired 
Number of hires from 
linked school-field 
Total number of 
graduates hired 
   Fathers Mothers Fathers  Mothers  Fathers Mothers 
  
Graduation year (GY)  0.019  0.013 0.030  0.023  0.031 0.024 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
GY+1 0.013  0.009  0.024 0.016 0.024  0.021 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
GY+2 0.006  0.004  0.012 0.006 0.010  0.007 
(0.001)** (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
GY+3 0.004  0.002  0.006 0.003 0.002  0.002 
(0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)  (0.002) 
GY+4 0.002  0.001  0.003 0.000 0.001  -0.002 
(0.000)** (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001)** (0.001)  (0.002) 
GY+5 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001 -0.003  -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)* (0.002)*  (0.002) 
Constant 0.002**  0.002**  0.007 0.005 0.049  0.066 
(average plant fixed effect)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
  
Sum of  0.042  0.028  0.072 0.048 0.068  0.053 
 effects (0-3)  (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.004)**  (0.004)** 
  
Sum of  0.044  0.029  0.075 0.046 0.065  0.048 
 effects (0-5)  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
                  
Sample  All plants  All plants  Small (< 16 employees) plants 
N     2,614,984    477,670  477,670
Plant FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: Sample include five years before and five years after graduation, excluding years in which the plant 
did not exist and plants which more than doubles or halves its labor force since the preceding year. An 
observation in the first two columns is a combination of type of class (school and field), plant, and year.  
Dependent variable in first two columns is the hired fraction of all graduates from the same school as the 
child of the employee finding of their first job during the year, estimate is for the fraction of these 
graduates that have a father/mother in the plant. An observation is a plant in the third to sixth column. 
Dependent variable in the third and fourth column is the number of hired workers from any school-field 
combination in which the plant is linked via a father/mother. Explanatory variables are the number of 
these children who graduate in the observation year (+ 1 to 5). Dependent variable in the 5th to sixth 
column is the number of hired graduates overall (i.e. from any track) during the year. Standard errors are 
cluster-corrected for dependencies within plants. 
 
In order to find the full effect on plant level recruitments, we use the pre-graduation 
years as a baseline and sum the effects found in the post-graduation years. The 
summation of the estimates suggests that the firm hire 4.6 percent of graduates as a 
result of the father-links and 3 percent of graduates as a result of the mother-links 
(Table 4). These estimates do not change if we allow for pre-graduation trends.   35 
An interesting follow-up question is whether links induce plants to hire more 
workers overall, or if they mainly redirect their hiring intentions. In order to analyze this 
question, we focus on small plants (defined as having on average less than 16 
employees during the sample period) where the shocks to total networks are likely to be 
most pronounced. Here we aggregate the data to the plant level and look at the number 
of links to graduates the plant has and relate this to the total number of recruitments of 
graduates (in their first jobs, but from any level of schooling). As above we rely on 
timing at graduation for identification. We separately estimate the number of 
recruitments of the linked type and the number of recruitments of graduates overall. 
Consistent with the overall finding, the evidence suggests a positive post-graduation 
effect on the propensity to hire workers of the linked type. Moreover, we also find an 
effect on overall recruitments of graduates, which suggests that stronger networks to 
graduating students induce (at least small) plants to hire more graduates.
21 Indeed, the 
estimated constants suggest that the average plant hires about 10 times as many 
graduates from other types of schooling in the pre-graduation years whereas the effects 
of graduation on the number of recruitments are of nearly identical size in both 
specifications which suggests that parental links increase the hiring probabilities of the 
linked children without reducing the hiring probabilities of other graduates.  
Overall, the evidence presented in this section supports the results of a significant 
impact of the parent-child links on the child’s probability of being hired by the plant of 
the parent. The results further suggest that (small) plants hire more graduates overall in 
the years when the children of employees graduate. Thus, the network effect does not 
appear to be the result of a reshuffling of vacancies between different graduates entering 
the labor market at the same time, or between similar graduates over time, but rather the 
result of new vacancies being opened (or made available to inexperienced workers at 
least). Finally, and importantly for our strategy, the timing model is one element 
showing that the parent is the agent of the match as postulated. 
                                                 
21 Note that we cannot analyze the propensity to hire workers overall since the sampling of parents essentially means 
drawing “random” workers within plants, a strategy which over-samples plants in years when they have many 
employees. This generates a spurious hump shape in plant size peaking in the sampling year (i.e. the year of 
graduation). 36   
5.4  Weak tie estimates 
In order to contrast our main results which focus on the role of strong social ties as 
defined by parent-child links we investigate the role of other links which could proxy 
weaker ties. Although it is difficult to find an exhaustive set of ties (weak or strong), we 
are able to analyze the role of a number of types of ties. We start by analyzing the role 
of classmates’ parents, by comparing the probability of being hired by a classmates’ 
parent’s plant relative to being hired by the plant of a graduate’s parent coming from a 
different cohort from the same school and field. Then, we analyze the role of 
neighborhoods by comparing the probability of working with a classmates’ parent as a 
function of geographical proximity (neighbors within the class versus non-neighbors 
within the class). Finally, we analyze the direct effect of classmates by comparing 
across educational cohorts within the same field and school (although we are unable to 
identify who is the agent of the match in this final context and thus will overstate the 
magnitudes, see e.g. Manski 1993). The estimates are presented in Table 5. Note that we 
change the units of analysis to the level of the field-school, or class-year-neighborhood, 
which explains the much smaller sample sizes.  
In the first part of Table 5 we show how classmates’ parents affect the probability of 
working in a specific plant. In the specification we analyze how the probability of a first 
job is affected by class proximity (hence, working in the plant of a classmate’s parent). 
The empirical strategy is similar to that of the main analysis, but the network indicator 
(A in equation (1)) in this case is equal to 1 when a classmate’s parent works in the plant 
and the fixed effect which defines the comparison group comprises all combinations of 
school, field, and plant of a parent (rather than class and plants of a parent). The effects 
are therefore identified through differences in probability of working with parents of 
classmates relative to working with parents of students who graduated in a previous or a 
later cohort from the same field and the same school. The estimates are all very close to 
zero. Hence, classmates’ parents do not play the role of one’s own parents. 
The second part analyzes the role of proximity by splitting each class by 
neighborhood and analyzing whether it is more likely to start working with a 
neighboring classmate’s parent than in the plant of other classmates’ parents, again 
using the same model as in the main analysis. Here we exclude parents and children 
who start working together and parents who work in another municipality, and (for   37 
computational convenience) restrict the sample to plants where only one parent within 
the class works.  
Table 5 Weak tie network effects 





high school  
University 
degree  All 
  
  
Classmates' parents (relative to parents' of other cohorts, same field and school) 
Fathers 
 
  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000 
(s.e.)  (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) 
N (classes)  6,202 13,772 7,713 5,560  33,247 
Mothers 
 
  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001  0.001 
(s.e.)  (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000)** 
N (classes)  6,114 13,791 7,787 5,769  33,461 
Neighboring classmates' parents (relative to other classmate's parents) 
Fathers 
 
  0.008 0.007 0.005 0.004  0.006 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.003)  (0.001)** 
N (class/neighb) 
2,986 6,591 6,861 1,178  17,616 
Mothers 
  0.003 0.012 0.006 0.007  0.007 
(s.e.)  (0.002) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.003)**  (0.001)** 
N (class/neighb) 
4,749 9,830 10,494 1,579  26,652 
Classmates (relative to other cohorts, same field and school) 
Males 
 
  0.006 0.014 0.005 0.006  0.008 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
N (classes)  6,605 14,148 7,936 5,594  34,283 
Mothers 
 
  0.005 0.013 0.004 0.005  0.008 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
N (classes)  6,696 14,253 8,082 5,787  34,818 
Note: Estimates of weak tie network effects. Weighted by the number of graduates in the class or class-
neighborhood. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable job within 7 years of graduation. 
Excluding children who starts working with their own parents and, for neighbor analysis, parents who 
work in a different municipality. Standard errors are cluster-corrected at the level of the fixed effect, i.e. 
for dependencies within field and school (and year for the neighborhood analysis). **Significant at the 1 
% level. 
 
The results indicate small, but mostly significant, network effects arising from being 
neighbors. Most estimates are between a half and one percent, which is in the vicinity of 
the baseline probability of working with any given parent of another graduate from the 
same class (neighbor or not). Interestingly, we do not see the clear pattern of 
diminishing network effects for graduates of higher levels of education. For fathers, the 
effects decreases very moderately with education and neighboring mothers are in fact 






γ ˆ38   
Roughly, the results indicate that, neighbors matter about as much for the low and high-
educated, while the own parent is 10-20 times as important as a neighboring classmate’s 
parent for least educated (comparing results in Table 2 and Table 5), but less than 4 
times as important for the university graduates. This is consistent with the presumption 
that ties’ strength is relatively more important for “weak” graduates. 
Finally, we analyze the direct role of classmates (leaving parents’ role aside). Here 
we estimate the difference in probability of finding the first job at the same plant as 
someone in the same class relative to those in other cohorts, but same field and school. 
It is important to note that this analysis suffers from some serious shortcomings. Most 
notably, we cannot isolate which agent is responsible for the match, and the estimates 
will therefore suffer from a “reflection” type problem where we are likely to inflate the 
estimates since two classmates who start working together will be classified as having 
recruited each other. Thus, we should consider the estimates as indicative upper bounds 
of the effects of classmates in the job finding process. Again, we find considerably 
smaller effect than in the main analysis, and, again, we do not find the clear pattern of 
smaller effects for more educated youths. 
5.5  Heterogeneous effects in the within-class model––when do strong ties 
matter? 
Estimation of equation (3) answers the question of how important parental contacts are 
on average, and for different subsamples. The evidence suggests that strong ties 
networks are more important for less educated youths. But in order to identify whether 
the heterogeneity is due to the educational performance of the child, due to the 
education or labor market status of the parent, or due to the regional characteristics or 
the nature of the firms in which parents of low educated children tend to live and work 
we need a richer model. We therefore expand our original framework (equation (1)) so 
as to incorporate effects that may vary with characteristics of the graduate (i), the parent 
(p), the labor market (l) or the plant (j),. This yields the following model:  
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where we have included observed characteristics (X) of graduates and parents as well as 
time-varying labor market conditions. We also allow for each plant to have a unique   39 
propensity to hire graduates with parents in the plant by incorporation of a plant fixed 
effect
j γ . 
Since all terms we add to the framework of equation (1) are interacted with the 
presence of a parent in the plant we may proceed as in Section 3 to get an expanded 
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where a ‘bar’ and superscript A denotes the average within class/plant for those with a 
parent in the plant. Consequently, 
A
i X  is the average of the individual characteristics 
among graduates from a given class with a parent in that plant.  
All terms in equation (5) come from the interaction between a parental contact and 
the measured characteristics, but the underlying model is the same. Thus, estimating 
equation (5) answers the question: when, where, and for whom do parent-child networks 
matter at entry in the children’ first stable job after graduating from school? All 
estimates therefore show when and for whom the effects are stronger.  
Because estimates turn out to very rarely differ with education, we only report 
pooled estimates over all levels of education. More important though, we present 
estimates with and without plant fixed effects. The estimates from models with plant 
fixed effects compare cases where graduates from different classes have parents in the 
same plant (possibly in different years), to see which graduates are more likely to be 
hired conditional on the plant the parent works at. This accounts for the possibility that 
plants have different propensities to hire children of their employees. Thus, when plant 
effects are included, identification comes from plants where more than one parent 
worked at some point of the analysis period. Note that the 850,000 contacts are 
distributed over almost 200,000 plants in the data so that each plant has on average 4 to 
5 parents of graduates over the 8 years we study. Clearly, we still have a fairly 
representative sample also in this case. 40   
Table 6a Parental Networks and heterogeneity 
   All  All - Plant FE    All All - Plant FE
       Family link   
Graduate        reference only father       
Female  -0.024 -0.021  Only mother in plant  -0.014 -0.006 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Nordic Immigrant  0.005 0.006  Both parents in plant  0.164 0.127 
(0.004) (0.005)  (0.003)**  (0.003)** 
Other Immigrant  -0.001 0.002     
(0.002) (0.002)  Education of graduate 
Age at graduation  -0.001 -0.002  reference Vocational HS   
(0.000)** (0.000)**  Compulsory  0.034 0.032 
GPA (1-5)  -0.006 -0.007  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  Academic HS  0.029 0.028 
  
(0.001)** (0.001)** 
University  -0.022 -0.023 
   (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
Fathers        Mothers       
Nordic Immigrant  0.001 0.005 
Nordic Immigrant 
0.004 0.006 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.002)*  (0.002)* 
Other Immigrant  0.008 0.006 
Other Immigrant 
0.017 0.012 




Compulsory  education 
0.008 0.008 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Tertiary education  -0.009 -0.012 
Tertiary education 
-0.011 -0.013 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Same (1d.) field as 
child 
0.023 0.024 
Same (1d.) field as child
0.009 0.012 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Log wage  0.046 0.045 
Log wage 
0.048 0.041 
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Tenure  0.002 0.002 
Tenure 
0.002 0.001 
(0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Note: Estimates of interacted network effects, the model also includes covariates in table 5b and 
graduation year dummies. An observation is a combination of class, plant and year of first job. Weighted 
by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable 
job within 7 years of graduation. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for dependencies within class. ** 
(*) Significant at the 1 (5) % level.    41 
 
For whom do parents matter?: Table 6a presents estimates for various individual 
characteristics of the child. The estimates confirm that the networks matter more for the 
less educated, even accounting for characteristics of the parent, the plant and the 
location. This is true also in the case of the plant fixed effects model. Thus, network 
effects, (conditional on parental education, tenure and wage) are larger the less educated 
the child is, even when comparing parents who work within the same plant. In addition, 
poor grades (a low GPA) increase the size of the network effect. We have re-estimated 
the model replacing grade by the position of the child in the within-class grade 
distribution yielding similar results. In addition, we have also looked at siblings, 
showing that a given parent is more likely to hire the child with the weaker grades.
22 We 
see only small differences between immigrants and natives and perhaps surprisingly, 
age at graduation has a negative impact, even controlling for plant fixed effects, i.e. 
within a class younger children benefit from their parents’ employment more than older 
ones, when entering their first job.. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that the 
effects of strong social ties are more important the weaker the position of the child. 
Further results confirm that females benefit less from their parents. In accordance 
with the results presented earlier, we find that paternal links are more important than 
maternal links. Importantly however, we see that most of the differences between 
mothers and fathers disappear when introducing plant fixed effects. Hence, within a 
plant, parents’ sex (on the demand side) plays a much more limited role. Mothers 
mainly work in plants which resort less to parental links. Apparently, part of the initial 
difference comes from mothers working more often in the public sector, where referral 
hiring is used much less intensively (see below).  
Who are the parents who matter? : Table 6a also displays the impact of parental 
characteristics, separately for mothers and fathers. Let us stress again the specificity of 
this analysis. We study which characteristics of the incumbent workers affect the 
probability that the firm will hire one of the incumbent’s children, holding the 
characteristics of the child constant. First, similarly as the demand side analysis above, 
low educated workers on the supply side make more use of the networks. Incumbents 
with a lower education have a higher probability of using their network (for a given 
                                                 
22 All results not shown here are available from the authors. 42   
education of the child) within plant. One possible explanation for this is that similarity 
in level of education reinforces the network effect.  
Further, results support this notion. In agreement with results shown above, parents 
who share (broad) field of study with their children are more likely to be working in the 
same plant as their children. Thus, family links are more important when skills also 
overlap. We also find that a given parent with multiple children is more likely to hire 
the child endowed with the same field of education as his/her (detailed results available 
upon request).  
We also study the parent’s wage, tenure at the plant.
23 Estimation results yield strong 
support to some elements of Montgomery’s model (but not to all, see just below) in the 
sense that well-attached workers appear to be more important: children of high-wage 
and high-tenure workers, even controlling for plant fixed effects, are more likely to be 
hired (in comparison with their classmates). Interestingly however, we also find, in 
apparent contradiction with Montgomery’s model, that the interaction between parents’ 
wage and the grades of the child is negative: parents who are paid high wages are more 
likely to hire children with relatively poor grades (detailed results available upon 
request). Indeed, his model tells us that referrals help firms to hire high-quality 
applicants. However, if parents do know something unobserved by the firm (the real 
productive quality of their child as opposed to scholarly grades), this result is still 
interpretable along the lines of the Montgomery model.  
Overall the results show that within a class of students graduating in the same field of 
study, those who have parents trained in the same broad field, or parents who are high-
wage and high tenure, are more likely to start working in the same plant as their parents. 
Note that all of our displayed estimates exclude self-employed parents but when 
including them we find that children of self-employed parents (not surprisingly) more 
often follow their parents than children of other employees in the same plants. 
                                                 
23 Since tenure only cannot be measured before 1985 it is not a perfect measure, especially so for the earlier cohorts. 
Hence the estimates may be biased downwards but since all comparisons are made within cohorts there is no reason 
to believe that measurement errors should be correlated with our outcomes.   43 
Table 6b Parental Networks and heterogeneity 
   All  All - Plant FE    All All - Plant FE
Industry-region        Plant char.       
Metropolitan county  -0.001 0.004  Private  0.023 0.010 
(0.001) (0.011)  (0.001)**  (0.003)** 
County unemployment 0.183 0.17 New plant  0.017 0.010 
(0.017)** (0.023)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Industry-field match  0.136 0.13 Plant growing from 
last year 
0.015 0.012 
(0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Industry-field match* 
unemployment  
-0.271 -0.268  Size <16 (ref 16-
45) 
0.006 0.006 
(0.064)** (0.075)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)** 
Market concentration 
(Herfindahl) 
-0.238 0.476  Size 46-125  0.009 -0.001 
(0.055)** (0.213)*  (0.001)**  (0.002) 
 Size 126-750  0.018 -0.002 
   (0.001)**  (0.002) 
   Size 750+  0.020 0.005 
   (0.001)**  (0.004) 
Worker composition at plant     Industry of plant    
Mean age  -0.006 -0.006  Construction  0.021 0.000 
(0.000)** (0.000)**  (ref manufact.)  (0.002)** (0.007) 
Share primary 
education 
0.022 0.028  Wholesale, retail  -0.003 0.004 
(0.002)** (0.006)**  (0.001)*  (0.008) 
Share tertiary 
education 
-0.010 0.001  Financial, corporate -0.008 -0.004 
(0.002)** -0.005  (0.001)**  (0.007) 
Immigrant share  0.023 0.019  Education R&D  -0.005 -0.005 
(0.003)** (0.007)*  (0.002)**  (0.008) 
Average log wage  -0.093 -0.126  Health, Social  -0.047 -0.036 
(0.002)** (0.004)**  (0.002)**  (0.008)** 
 Personal & Cultural -0.005 -0.003 
N  788,028 729,124 (0.002)** (0.010) 
N (parents)   823,516 754,150Public admin.  -0.014 -0.009 
N (plants)  157,518 88,286 (0.001)** (0.008) 
 Note: Estimates of interacted network effects, the model also includes covariates in table 5a and 
graduation year dummies. An observation is a combination of class, plant and year of first job. Weighted 
by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable 
job within 7 years of graduation. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for dependencies within class. ** 
(*) Significant at the 1 (5) % level.  44   
In which types of plants do parents who matter work?: Table 6b presents results 
from the same regressions focusing on regional characteristics, unemployment, and 
market conditions. In particular a fragmentation of the market as measured by the 
Herfindahl index in the industry is associated with more referral hiring in the cross-
section however, when plant fixed effects are introduced the result is reversed. Thus, 
referral hiring is used more intensely within plants when fragmentation in the industry is 
reduced (i.e. when the Herfindahl index in the plant industry increases over time).  
Importantly, high unemployment seems to favor matching of parents and children 
within plants. Networks are also used more commonly when the industry of the parent 
is a more logical destination (hence more “relevant”) for the typical graduate with the 
type of education that the child has (see section 4.2.3 regarding the definition of this 
education-to-industry variable). It therefore suggests that networks are used mostly 
when workers with types of education that fits the plants’ typical needs are hired, thus 
again pointing towards the reinforcing effect of similarity between the child and the 
potential destination (note though, again, that the effect is estimated relative to 
classmates who have the same type of training). Results on the interaction between the 
industry-field match and unemployment show that this pattern is strongly reduced when 
unemployment is high. Thus, when unemployment is high, networks are used more 
often. And, hired children have an education which is less likely to be in line with the 
plants’ typical recruitment patterns.  
Finally, Table 6b also shows results for plant characteristics. First, “family” hiring 
takes place mostly in large (or in very small) plants, in manufacturing industries, in the 
private sector (consistent with Table 3), and in firms with a large fraction of immigrants 
(consistent with patterns of workplace segregation found in Åslund and Skans, 2009). 
Employment growth also favors referrals.
24 
Parental networks, occupations, and the role of information: To get a better 
sense of the causal role of parents and the underlying mechanisms, in particular the role 
of information, we analyze the characteristics of the occupations/educations that are 
most (or least) frequently obtained through parents. Because the education categories 
(with closely related associated occupations) are very well defined for the vocational 
                                                 
24 Not surprisingly, many estimates are imprecise when including the plant fixed effects since many of the associated 
variables barely change at the plant level. Interestingly, however, we see that the private sector indicator is 
significant, even in this specification, indicating that privatized plants tend to increase their use of referrals.   45 
high school sample (examples are masons, restaurants, telecommunications, 
secretary…), we restrict attention in this paragraph to the vocational high-school 
sample. We start by estimating a network effect for each combination of municipality 
and occupation (more precisely, the detailed education received in vocational high 
school).
25 The resulting estimates are used as endogenous variables in a second stage 
where we try to explain the relative magnitude by educational and regional 
characteristics.  
 
Table 7 Use of parent networks by municipality/poccupation among vocatinal high 
school graduates 
    a b c d  e f 
1000s of employing plants  0.068 0.026 0.027 0.040  0.023 0.009 
(0.013)** (0.009)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.007)**  (0.002)** 
1000s of workers  -0.017  -0.010  -0.013  -0.011 
(0.004)** (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.003)** 
Constant  0.061 0.063 0.061 0.062  0.065 0.061 
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
N  3,228 3,228 3,228 3,228 3,228  3,228 
Municipality fixed effects  Yes No  Yes Yes  No  Yes 
Size  weights  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: The table shows regressions where we explain the municipality/occupation specific use of parent 
networks by number of employing plants by education and municipality. The number of plants is 
calculated for 1995 by education and municipality using the full stock of employees (unweighted average 
# of plants is 78, weighted average is 228, max is 3893 ). Network effects (i.e. the dependent variable) is 
estimated using all years (the same model as in table 2). ** Significant at the 1 % level. 
 
To measure how diverse the receiving market for each occupation-education is 
within the municipality, we compute the number of plants that employ at least one 
worker with such an occupation-education (using the full stock of employees in the 
1995 data). We also compute the number of workers, in each municipality having each 
type of education (again, in the year 1995). We use the number of plants and number of 
workers as the main explanatory variables in models with or without municipality 
effects, with or without a control for the number of workers, with or without weights 
(number of employed parents). Results are presented in Table 7. The results are robust 
to the various controls and the message clear: Hiring through parental contacts is more 
common for occupations that are used in a large number of plants. Put differently, the 
                                                 
25 Resulting estimates are available from the authors. 46   
less specific the type of education is in terms of which plant hires the workers, the more 
prevalent is the use of networks. We have re-estimated the model after characterizing 
occupational dispersion by a segregation index (exposure) instead, receiving a similarly 
clear picture – the rarer the occupation of the graduate is at his future employer (e.g. 
receptionists) the stronger is the network effect.  
We interpret these results as showing that networks are used less frequently when the 
set of potential hiring firms is small (hence, easier for the graduate to find). An 
interpretation in terms of information seems reasonable: firms need matchmakers when 
many applicants arrive for jobs that are less specific to that firm (for which relations 
with (vocational) high schools are less likely to have been developed). Furthermore, 
students also need parents help when there are many firms that are susceptible of 
employing them. The parents’ employer is a natural focal point in this coordination 
problem. Conversely, graduates with a more specific education, (e.g. a carpenter) can 
easily identify firms that employ them but those with a more general type of education 
(electricians, manufacturing workers…) might face more potential employers and 
therefore need networks to a greater extent.  
5.6  Strong social tie recruitments and other outcomes 
In this subsection we provide evidence on the quality of the jobs provided through 
parental networks. We also document the effect (on wage growth) on parental outcomes 
of having a child hired in the “parental” plant. We analyze the quality of the jobs by 
studying three outcomes measured at the time of the first job: time since graduation, 
initial wage and relevance of the industry relative to the education of the graduate. We 
then proceed to median term outcomes, measured three years after the first job was 
found. In this case we restrict the sample to those finding a first job within four years 
from graduation. These outcomes are the probability of being employed three years 
after entry, the probability of working in the same plant 3 years after entry, as well as 
wage growth during the three years after entry. Of course, we can only measure wage 
growth for those who are employed (in some firm) three years after entering their first 
job. We present results for two models, one which includes fixed effects for each 
combination of class and time to first job, and one which controls for educational 
characteristics as well as a plant fixed effects (we have estimated a model with class 
fixed effects and plant characteristics, giving very similar results to the one with plant   47 
fixed effects only). Interpretations of these two models are slightly different. The first 
model looks at the relationship between finding a first job at a parent’s plant and our 
outcomes of interest. In this specification, the estimate may well include effects due to 
unobserved plant characteristics. The second model, because it includes plant fixed 
effects, allows estimates to be measured in difference from other graduates finding their 
first job in the same plant, but through channels other than parents referral hiring. The 
model thereby isolates the effect of getting a job through a parent, within a given plant. 
All models control for grades, gender, and immigration status.  
Results presented in Table 8 first demonstrate that workers who find a job where 
their parents work, find this job faster than classmates
26 and also faster than others who 
start working in the same plant, after accounting for educational characteristics. Second, 
starting wages are lower for those who get their first job at their mothers’ plant, but 
starting wage are not much different from classmates if they find their first job through 
their fathers. However, when controlling for the plant (observed or unobserved) 
characteristics at which the first job was found, wages are always lower than for jobs 
found through other channels, irrespective of the parent who helped find the job (note 
that we obtain similar results when we estimate the model within class and add 
observed plant characteristics). Children following their parents receive a low (within-
plant) wage, but fathers provide access to high-wage plants. Third, graduates, getting 
their first jobs through their parents, find these jobs in less “relevant” industries than 
those their classmates find. Therefore, they enter industries in which individuals 
endowed with their type of education most generally do not find their first jobs. This 
result also holds within plant. 
                                                 
26 Obviously we do not control for time to first job in these regressions as we do in the rest of Table 8. 48   
Table 8 Effects of finding a job through parental or sibling referral 
   ln(Time to first job)  ln(Starting wage)  Relevance of industry 
Mother only  -0.180  -0.136  -0.056 -0.058  -0.02  -0.028 
(0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)**  (0.003)** (0.002)**  (0.001)**
Father only   -0.197  -0.149  0.011 0.008  -0.043  -0.024 
(0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.003)*  (0.001)**  (0.001)**
Both -0.264  -0.223  -0.039 -0.042  -0.038  -0.029 
(0.006)** (0.008)** (0.006)**  (0.006)** (0.002)**  (0.002)**
Sibling -0.101  -0.077  0.029 0.027  -0.023  -0.010 
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**  (0.004)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**
N 573,060  573,060  573,060  573,060 573,060  573,060 
Class Fe  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Ed. char  --  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes 
Plant FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
                        Outcomes after three years (only if first job within 4 years) 
   In same plant  Employment  Wage growth (3 years) 
Mother only  0.047  0.030  0.006 0.009  0.049  0.060 
(0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)  (0.004)* (0.006)**  (0.004)** 
Father only   0.103  0.053  0.025 0.018  0.025  0.056 
(0.004)** (0.003)**  (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.005)**  (0.004)** 
Both 0.204  0.136  0.072 0.063  0.067  0.083 
(0.008)** (0.007)**  (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.009)**  (0.008)** 
Sibling 0.087  0.051  0.032 0.028  -0.002  0.014 
(0.005)** (0.004)**  (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.006)  (0.004)** 
N 521,642  521,642  521,642  521,642 380,666  380,666 
Class Fe  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Ed. char  --  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes 
Plant FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Note: Estimates are for the conditional association between getting the the first job at the plant of parents 
and subsequent outcomes. Relevance of industry measures the fraction of all graduates with the same 
education who found the first job in that industry. Outcomes 3 years later are for the sample that got the 
first job within 4 years. The first model includes a fixed affect for each class and year of first job (only for 
class in the analysis of time to first job). The second model includes plant fixed effects and dummies for 
each field and level of education. All regressions control for immigration status, gender and GPA (except 
for university graduates). Data are for graduates 1988-1995. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for 
dependencies within class. ** (*) Significant at the 1 % (5 %) level. 
 
In the second panel of Table 8, we look at outcomes three years after finding their 
first job. Estimates show a very strong positive effect of entering the plant where a 
parent works on the probability of staying in their first plant for at least three more 
years. This effect remains strong and significant, albeit roughly halved, when including 
plant fixed effects, suggesting a) that parents match children to jobs in plants where the 
expected tenure is long, and b) provide jobs with longer tenure within each plant.   49 
Parental matches are also associated with slightly increased overall employment 
probabilities three years later. Finally, the estimated effects on wage growth display a 
pattern of effects suggesting that wage growth is faster for the youths who start working 
with their parents, even within plant. In effects this compensates for the lower starting 
wages. When re-estimating the model controlling for starting wages (results are 
available on request) the pattern is much less pronounced, after controlling for plant 
fixed effects, wage growth for workers entering with the help of their fathers looks just 
slightly higher than that observed for other entry channels whereas the estimates for 
jobs obtained through mothers remain unchanged. 
Table 8 also includes an indicator for having a sibling (brother or sister) in the same 
plant, despite the low occurrence of such co-presence noted before (3 percent). The 
effects of siblings are in most models similar to that of parents, although the wage 
pattern differs by being positive for starting wages, but without the positive wage 
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Figure 5 Wage growth (log difference) of recruiting parents relative to other stable co-
workers (at least 35 years old and five years of ensuing tenure). 
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Finally, in Figure 5, we display the wage growth of parents before and after the 
recruitment of a graduate into the plant of the parent. The Figure displays the wage 
growth relative to that of other stable workers (aged at least 35 and with at least 5 years 
of tenure before leaving) in order to give an appropriate baseline and in order to exclude 
the recruited children from the calculation. The Figure shows that wage growth among 
the recruiting parents is above the mean wage growth before the child is hired, which is 
consistent with the picture emerging from the heterogeneity analysis. This extra wage 
growth does however stop at the exact time of recruitment of the graduate. We have 
analyzed the wage growth pattern of the other parent as well and we do find some 
indications of falling wage growth around the time of the child’s first job (suggesting a 
labor supply reaction), but without the sharp pattern around the time of hiring shown in 
Figure 5. The pattern shown in the Figure suggests that parents either over-perform 
before the (possible) recruitment in order to provide a positive signal, or that child’s 
recruitment is a substitute for their own wage increases. In any case, this result (as well 
as the results from the timing model) indicates real effects for the parent (and the 
parent’s firm) around the time of the child’s hiring (and graduation) which support the 
notion that the parent is indeed the agent of the match.  
6 Conclusion 
In this article, we have examined the impact of parental networks at the moment of 
entry on the labor market. We have presented a set of empirical models that allows the 
identification and the estimation of the magnitudes, sources, and effects of family based 
networks. For estimation, we used a unique data set constructed from various 
administrative data sources linking information on parents and children, giving the plant 
identifier of both parents and children, and identifiers of all classmates of all children 
graduating from any level of regular schooling in Sweden over a seven years period. We 
show that having your first stable job in the same plant as one of your parents is quite 
frequent. Or, conversely, a plant is substantially more likely to hire one of his 
employees’ children than someone else from the same class. 
We show that strong social ties as captured by family ties matter more, the weaker 
the position of the child. This is a robust finding which appears in many dimensions, in 
particular lower education, poorer grades, and higher unemployment increases the   51 
relative importance of strong social ties. This heterogeneity withstand models which 
account for other forms of (potentially correlated) heterogeneity on the parent, region, 
and plant side, most notably when comparing different parents employed within the 
same plant. We also show that the effects of weak ties are more equally distributed over 
weak and strong children implying that strong ties are relatively more important for 
poor performing children. Consistent with the strong ties hypothesis, we find that 
parents have to be present in the plant at the time of hiring, the effects become small 
once the parent has left the plant, and other plants within the parents’ firm play virtually 
no role.  
However, not all potential agents of the match matter equally. Those that do are 
mostly high-wage workers and have relatively long tenures at the plant, even controlling 
for plant fixed effects. The fact that parents with a strong position matter more is a 
result very much in line with Montgomery (1991). However, our results on the children 
observable characteristics do not fully support this type of models.  
We also find that several dimensions of similarity reinforce the networks effects. The 
effects are stronger for parents with a similar field of education as that of their child, 
parents who work in industries for which the education of the child is useful, and the 
parent with the same gender as the child. Crucially, all such dimensions of 
heterogeneity increase the estimated effects relative to a control group of classmates 
who also share the same links to the plant (thus removing any direct effect of 
similarity).  
Particularly telling is the fact that the occupation-education categories for which 
parents appear to matter the most are the ones that are least specific, and where 
destinations are harder to predict: not masons or cooks but secretarial work, sales, or 
administrative jobs. Hence, children in fields that are less well-defined, used in many 
different industries or plants, appear to be helped by their parents in order to locate, and 
get, their first jobs.  
Finally, the initial wage paid to the child is lower than for equivalent persons 
entering the plant through other channels, again controlling for plant fixed effects. 
However, this is compensated in the mid-term; these children spend longer spells in 
their first job than hires without a parent in the plant. Firms thus appear to benefit from 52   
parental hiring, not by selecting better applicants, as suggested in Montgomery (1991), 
but by keeping these young hires for longer periods of time.  
The identification strategies induced by our two empirical models capture the 
differential supply shocks that affect the different potential employing firms leaving 
firms’ labor demand unaffected. Indeed, by comparing children from the same 
classroom with the same education potentially shared with that of their parents, we 
capture the differential connections between children and firms. Furthermore, by 
showing how the timing of graduation of children of their employees directly affect 
their hiring behavior; we see that firms adapt their recruitment patterns to directed 
supply shocks. Finally, the effect of having her child hired at one’s own plant is being 
felt by the parent: wage growth gets negatively affected. These two elements 
demonstrate that parents are indeed the strong tie between the firm and the job-seeking 
child.   53 
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Appendix A: Data  
A1 The establishment data 
By dividing total remuneration by the number of months between the first and the last 
entry, we get a measure of monthly wages received from each employer.  We use this 
measure of wages to define employment in a procedure which closely resembles how 
Statistics Sweden calculates employment from these data. We define a person as being 
employed if an employment spell a) covers February b) generates at least 50 % of a 
minimum monthly wage
27 c) for individuals having several jobs satisfying these criteria 
during one year, we only keep the job generating the highest income.  
There are two main differences with Statistics Sweden’s procedure. First, we study 
employment in February rather than November. We select this month in order to 
characterize where parents work at the beginning of each year. Second, we use a slightly 
higher wage threshold in order to minimize measurement errors in wages for employees 
working very few hours.
28  
The procedure provides us with a data set containing one February job per worker 
and year. The job is defined by a wage and a plant
29 and the plant can be linked to 
various characteristics such as industry and location. In some cases (5-6 %) an 
employee’s job cannot be located at a specific plant, mostly because plants are defined 
by physical addresses and some jobs do not take place at a specified address. Examples 
of such jobs include home care, some construction workers, some sales persons, 
security personnel and workers lacking “normal” contracts such as artists, board 
members, and people mostly working at home. We consider the establishment 
information for these individuals as missing.   
Throughout the analysis we use administrative identifiers to define physical 
establishments. However, the administrative numbers may change over time if there is a 
change in ownership or industry affiliation. Since part of the analysis builds on 
following plants over time we correct for this by linking plants with different identifiers 
but (almost) the same set of employees in order to minimize the impact of such changes. 
A plant with code “A” in year 1 is considered to be the same as a plant with code “B” in 
year 2 if a) more than 50 % of employees in plant A in year 1 works in plant B in year 2 
                                                 
27 Defined as the wage paid to janitors that are employed by municipalities. 
28 For papers using similar strategies see e.g. Skans, Edin, Holmlund (2009) and Åslund and Skans (2009). 
29 We refer to all establishments as “plants”. 58   
and b) more than 50 % of those at plant B in year 2 worked at plant A in year 1 and c) at 
least 3 people worked in both plant A in year 1 and in plant B in year 2.
30 When such 
correspondences are found we change all the numbers in the data set back in time in 
order to get consistent data series. 
A2 Defining classes and classmates 
In order to construct the classes we use the most detailed level of the Swedish 
standardized educational codes (“sun-2000”).
31 The field codes are provided with a four 
digit “hierarchical” structure, so that fields can be described at different levels of 
precision.
32 Since the same field of specialization can be provided at different levels, 
such as two or three year-long high-school training in construction work or 
bachelors/master degrees in economics, we always interact the field codes with the level 
codes in order to get our definition of a class (so that e.g. bachelor and masters degree 
graduates are coded differently). 
As we show below, the class concepts differ slightly between the four different 
groups of graduates. Since the concept of a class is the basis for our identification, it is 
important to understand how these are constructed. Therefore, we now discuss in some 
detail how the classes are defined for each type of educational attainment.  
For graduates from universities, we define a class by combining information on the 
graduation year and semester (fall or spring) and a code for the examining university or 
college. There are graduates from 88 different schools in the data. The field codes are 
quite precise; examples of specific fields are “Economics/economic history”, “Law”, 
“Medical Doctor, specialized in radiology”, “Nurse, specialized in geriatrics”, “Teacher 
in Math/Data/Science”, “Science, Chemistry”, “Civil Engineer, Chemistry”. When we 
interact the field and level codes we get over 300 types of university educations within 
our analysis sample (see Table A1 below). 
In the case of high schools we proceed similarly, and obtain 106 different vocational 
educations and 25 academic high school educations respectively. Because these 
programs are fairly standardized, we have a relatively small number of academic high 
school educations (as the name implies, these are mainly general courses aiming at the 
transition into higher education). The main academic programs are divided into “Social 
                                                 
30 We relax c) when the set of workers is identical between the two years in the two plants. 
31 We transform codes from the old system to sun 2000 by means of a matrix provided by Statistics Sweden. 
32 The fourth digit is actually a letter, in order to provide a higher level of detail when needed.   59 
Sciences or Humanities”, “Science”, “Economics”, and “Engineering”. The engineering 
program is more job-oriented than the other programs and many different specialties are 
provided (e.g. construction, machinery or electronics), in which case the graduates are 
coded according to their specialty. The engineering program also provides the 
opportunity to study for 4-years (coded separately). 
The level of detail in the field of study is obviously much greater for vocational 
programs. Here, each program is directed to a specific occupation. The graduates are 
coded in fields such as “Construction work”, “Auto mechanics”, “Social work, child 
care”, “Trade and office assistants”, “Electricians, installations”, “Electricians, data, and 
telecommunication” ... In this case, there are also different levels since vocational 
programs can be either two or three years long. 
Graduates from compulsory education do not belong to specific fields. Education in 
the compulsory schools is quite standardized even though some courses are chosen by 
the individuals. Compulsory school graduates may in many cases have started high 
school but dropped out, but we do not know what kind of training they may have 
received there. We however treat members of this group as unskilled, with no field of 
specialization. Thus a compulsory school “class” is defined as graduates from one 
compulsory school in a given year that either did not proceed to high school or dropped 
out if they did.  60   
Table A1 Descriptive statistics of graduates and parents 
   Comp. Vocational Academic University  All 
All graduates                
Female 0.435 0.421 0.524 0.602  0.491 
Nordic immigrant  0.011 0.010 0.008 0.015  0.011 
Other imm.  0.067 0.031 0.032 0.029  0.035 
Age 16.063 18.399 19.013 25.096  19.746 
Age (sd)  0.242 0.622 0.555 2.572 3.252 
GPA 2.650 3.053 3.121 3.000  3.008 
GPA (sd)  0.682 0.598 0.562 0.000  0.549 
Mean class size  19.8 29.5 42.4 44.6  35.2 
Class size (sd)  10.4 22.4 28.7 39.3  29.1 
Class size by year of first job  5.2 11.1 13.2 28.4  14.8 
(sd) 3.5 11.0 11.6 30.3  18.6 
Number of fields  1 106 25 321  453 
Father identified  0.974 0.985 0.987 0.973  0.981 
Mother identified  0.995 0.998 0.998 0.983  0.994 
Both identified  0.971 0.984 0.986 0.972  0.980 
Father Employed  0.673 0.762 0.804 0.691  0.747 
..in known plant*  0.580 0.652 0.714 0.610  0.651 
Mother Employed  0.666 0.742 0.810 0.740  0.751 
..in known plant*  0.590 0.651 0.742 0.681  0.675 
Both Employed  0.383 0.458 0.563 0.479  0.482 
Both in same Plant  0.029 0.034 0.045 0.038  0.037 
N (graduates)  82,341 238,521 178,324 141,161  640,347 
Employed parents with known Plant-ID, excluding agriculture and self employed 
Mother Nordic Immigrant  0.070 0.056 0.049 0.035 0.051 
Mother Other Immigrant  0.063 0.050 0.067 0.171  0.084 
Mother Compulsory  0.305 0.315 0.207 0.192 0.253 
Mother Tertiary  0.193 0.161 0.329 0.433 0.277 
Mother in same field  0.000 0.120 0.135 0.177  0.132 
Mothers log Wage  9.430 9.272 9.380 9.391 9.349 
Mothers log Wage (sd)  0.386 0.354 0.381 0.398 0.381 
Mothers tenure  3.921 3.569 3.755 4.180 3.801 
Mothers tenure (sd)  3.835 3.088 3.114 3.118 3.203 
N (mothers)  48,608 155,161 132,322 96,166  432,257 
Father Nordic Immigrant  0.051 0.043 0.034 0.025 0.038 
Father Other Immigrant  0.092 0.095 0.116 0.264 0.136 
Father Compulsory  0.400 0.422 0.254 0.220 0.327 
Father Tertiary  0.156 0.126 0.298 0.404  0.239 
Father in same field  0.000 0.192 0.281 0.215  0.205 
Fathers log Wage  9.747 9.639 9.808 9.841 9.745 
Fathers log Wage (sd)  0.418 0.373 0.432 0.481 0.429 
Fathers tenure  4.884 4.286 4.239 4.516 4.388 
Fathers tenure (sd)  4.316 3.312 3.269 3.161 3.406 
N (fathers)  47,784 155,539 127,358 86,130 416,811 
N (parents)  96,392 310,700 259,680 182,296  849,068 
N (plants)  47,580 93,886 84,964 60,553  157,586 
Note: Description of all graduates and employed parents with known Plant-ID:s. See Table A4 for a 
description of the transformed data used in heterogeneity regressions. * Also exclude self employed 
parents and parents employed in the agriculture and forestry industry.   61 
A3 First stable job of graduates: Sample construction 
For each graduate we look for the first stable job they have after graduation. Some of 
the university graduates had stable jobs before starting (or less commonly, during) 
university but these jobs are ignored. In order to get symmetry between the graduation 
cohorts we only include those that find a first stable job within 7 years after graduation 
(remember that the last graduating cohort is 1995 and data stop in 2002).  
 
Table A2: Creation of job data (parents) 
   All 16-65 (1988)  All 16-65 (1995) 
Parents in graduation 
year 
   N Fraction N Fraction N  Fraction
Population (individuals)  5,334,727 1 5,607,753 1 1,265,142 1
Employment according to Statistics Sweden 
November 4,347,401 0.815 3,796,432 0.677 1,041,078 0.823
Anytime during the year  4,807,023 0.901 4,558,659 0.813 1,093,199 0.864
Data creation 
Jobs 8,149,152 1.528 6,982,150 1.245 1,817,233 1.436
Jobs with Plant-ID  6,562,635 1.230 5,880,534 1.049 1,363,349 1.078
Plants* 304,949 0.057 332,370 0.059 262,221 0.207
Individuals with jobs  4,974,115 0.932 4,696,508 0.838 1,004,948 0.794
…in February  4,588,783 0.860 4,202,953 0.749 858,313 0.678
..and earnings>cut-off  3,595,163 0.674 3,271,469 0.583 771,054 0.609
..and identified plant  3,306,485 0.620 3,058,382 0.545 718,751 0.568
..not self emp. or agriculture  3,137,681 0.588 2,900,262 0.517 681,861 0.539
Individuals with multiple jobs 53,126 0.010 42,275 0.008 158,820 0.126
Note: The "N" columns give the number of individuals, jobs or plants. The "Fraction" columns show "N" 
as a share of the total population (as given in first row). *Excluding self employed and 
agriculture/forrestry. 
 
We then look for the plant in which each of the parents was employed in February 
during the year when the graduate found her first stable job. When applying our 
empirical model, we compare graduates from the same class finding their first stable job 
in a given year. Therefore, we drop observations for which all graduates from a given 
class found their jobs in a year and all had parents working in the same plant (since in 
these cases there is no variation within the fixed effect). In practice, this almost 
exclusively means dropping graduates who were alone in their class in finding a job in a 
particular year. 62   
Our data set contains graduates, identifiers of their class (and thus their “field”), their 
personal characteristics, as well as the year he or she found her first stable job, as well 
identifiers for each student’s mother and father. The identifiers are then used to check 
whether the plant in which the graduate finds her first stable job is a plant in which any 
of the parents to the classmates worked at the time. 
 
Table A3 Creation of graduates’ first job data 
Time (t) after graduation    
t = -1 t = 1 t = 3  t = 5
Graduates with any job 0.864 0.885 0.881  0.873
Number of Jobs per graduate 1.478 1.590 1.439  1.417
Jobs at least 4 months 0.650 0.800 0.812  0.817
and 3 monthly wages  0.074 0.532 0.600 0.630
Known Plant-ID  0.067 0.479 0.551  0.590
Multiple jobs  0.002 0.029 0.032  0.040
Note: Colum for t = -1 excludes compulsory since no information is available before age 16   63 
Table A4: Description of transformed regression data for Tables 6a and 6b 
Variable N Weighted Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Hired by parent  788,022 812,750 0.064406 0.241 0 1
Hired by classmates parent  788,022 812,750 0.004797 0.045 0 1
Network effect  788,022 812,750 0.059609 0.237 -1 1
Individual characteristics                   
Female 788,022 812,750 0.492 0.495 0 1
Nordic Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.006 0.077 0 1
Other Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.022 0.144 0 1
Age at graduation  788,022 812,750 19.692 3.072 16 30
GPA 788,022 812,750 3.046 0.533 1 5
Only mother in Plant  788,022 812,750 0.497 0.496 0 1
Both parents in Plant  788,022 812,750 0.029 0.164 0 1
Compulsory 788,022 812,750 0.114 0.317 0 1
Academic HS  788,022 812,750 0.305 0.461 0 1
University 788,022 812,750 0.215 0.411 0 1
Mothers - measured relative to mean among mothers by child's education    
Nordic Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.155 -0.070 0.965
Other Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.195 -0.171 0.950
Compulsory education  788,022 812,750 -0.001 0.308 -0.315 0.808
tertiary education  788,022 812,750 0.001 0.310 -0.433 0.839
Same (1d.) field as child  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.233 -0.177 0.880
Log wage  788,022 812,750 0.045 0.264 -1.113 3.518
Tenure 788,022 812,750 0.004 2.290 -4.180 13.431
Fathers - measured relative to mean among fathers by child's education    
Nordic Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.132 -0.051 0.975
Other Immigrant  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.236 -0.264 0.908
Compulsory education  788,022 812,750 -0.001 0.322 -0.422 0.780
Tertiary education  788,022 812,750 0.001 0.290 -0.404 0.874
Same (1d.) field as child  788,022 812,750 0.000 0.276 -0.281 0.808
Log wage  788,022 812,750 0.045 0.292 -1.515 4.439
Tenure 788,022 812,750 0.007 2.397 -4.884 12.761
Region and competition                   
Metropolitan county  788,022 812,750 0.488 0.500 0 1
County Unemployment rate  788,022 812,750 0.048 0.030 0.008 0.128
Industry field match  788,022 812,750 0.086 0.180 0.000 1.000
Herfindahl 788,022 812,750 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.077
(Table continues on next page) 64   
Table A4 (Continued) 
Plant                   
Private 788,022 812,750 0.491 0.500  0 1
New Plant  788,022 812,750 0.031 0.172  0 1
Plant growing  788,022 812,750 0.429 0.495  0 1
Size 1-15  788,022 812,750 0.258 0.437  0 1
Size 46-125  788,022 812,750 0.208 0.406  0 1
Size 126-750  788,022 812,750 0.206 0.405  0 1
Size 750+  788,022 812,750 0.119 0.324  0 1
Plant mean age of employees  788,022 812,750 42.7 4.6  21 65
Plant share of primary ed. 788,022 812,750 0.238 0.212  0 1
Plant share of tertiary ed. 788,022 812,750 0.290 0.272  0 1
Plant share of immigrants  788,022 812,750 0.104 0.116 0 1
Plant average log wage  788,022 812,750 9.517 0.275 8 13
Manufacturing 788,022 812,750 0.218 0.413 0 1
Construction 788,022 812,750 0.056 0.231  0 1
Wholesale or retail  788,022 812,750 0.184 0.387  0 1
Financial, corporate services 788,022 812,750 0.098 0.297  0 1
Education, R&D  788,022 812,750 0.105 0.307 0 1
Health, Social work  788,022 812,750 0.219 0.414  0 1
Personal, Cultural, Sanitation  788,022 812,750 0.047 0.212  0 1
Public administration  788,022 812,750 0.073 0.259 0 1







Table A5 Components in the estimated network effects of Table 2 









    
Fraction hired by fathers  0.1114 0.0890 0.0990 0.0218 0.0807
Hired by classmates father  0.0067 0.0074 0.0037 0.0019 0.0050
Estimated network effect  0.1044 0.0814 0.0952 0.0199 0.0755
Fraction hired by mothers  0.0867 0.0653 0.0715 0.0233 0.0603
Hired by classmates mother  0.0070 0.0083 0.0037 0.0035 0.0057
Estimated network effect  0.0794 0.0570 0.0678 0.0198 0.0545
Note: Rows correspond to R
A, R
-A and G of equation 2 to 3. For further details, see note to Table 2.   65 
Appendix B Additional figures and tables 
 
 
Figure B1 Fraction of graduates hired by a paternal-linked plant before and after 
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Figure B2 Fraction of graduates hired by a maternal-linked plant before and after 
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Table B1 Parental Networks and the time to first job, within-class estimates 
   t = 0  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7 
Fathers 
                       
Compulsory                      
γ  0.291 0.152 0.103 0.112  0.099 0.078 0.058 0.040 
(s.e.)  (0.013)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**  (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
N   1,299 7,603 6,414 8,163  8,296 7,006 4,913 3,178 
Vocational 
γ  0.089 0.075 0.089 0.081  0.060 0.053 0.038 0.032 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.007)** 
N   56,173 51,018 21,762 12,091  5,649 2,624 1,283 608 
Academic 
γ  0.133 0.086 0.079 0.071  0.056 0.038 0.038 0.023 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.008)** 
N   36,449 45,550 23,818 10,931  4,434 1,901 810  386 
University 
γ  0.024 0.012 0.022 0.024 0.020  0.004 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.006)**  (0.004) 
N   51,414 27,637 4,176  1,244 556  250 
Mothers                         
Compulsory 
γ  0.196 0.094 0.089 0.096  0.079 0.057 0.050 0.048 
(s.e.)  (0.013)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)**  (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** 
N   1,110 7,118 6,378 8,169  8,662 7,346 5,223 3,368 
Vocational 
γ  0.067 0.056 0.053 0.042  0.038 0.032 0.035 0.036 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.002)**  (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.007)** 
N   53,505 50,445 22,345 12,644  5,947 2,797 1,382 668 
Academic 
γ  0.105 0.061 0.048 0.043  0.031 0.035 0.028 0.018 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)**  (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.006)** 
N   36,242 46,516 24,784 11,626  4,784 2,086 912  437 
University 
γ  0.023 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.006  0.000 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.003)*  (0.000) 
N  
57,074  30,618  4,728  1,448  683 281        
Note: Estimates of parental network effects. An observation is a combination of class, plant, and year of first job. 
Weighted by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable job 
within 7 years of graduation. Only regressions with at least 100 observations are shown. Standard errors are cluster-
corrected for dependencies within class. ** (*) Significant at the 1 (5) % level. 68   
Table B2 Parental networks effect on probability of finding the first job in a specific 
plant, depending on whether field of study matches that of parent 











Vocational       
Fathers       
 
 
  0.121 0.137  0.169  0.072  0.073 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.011)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.089 0.104  0.132  0.052  0.053 
(s.e.)  (0.003)** (0.004)**  (0.006)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 





  0.117 0.119  0.107  0.087  0.088 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.002)**  (0.003)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.094 0.096  0.101  0.061  0.061 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.002)**  (0.003)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 





  0.025 0.032  --  0.020  0.020 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.003)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.023 0.031  --  0.022  0.022 
(s.e.)  (0.003)** (0.007)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
N 
1,976 575  97,802  99,525 
 Note: Estimates of parental network effects. An observation is a combination of class, plant, and year of first job. 
Weighted by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable job 
within 7 years of graduation. Only regressions with at least 100 observations are shown. Regressions based on those 
within the class who have the same (or different) field of education as their parent. Standard errors are cluster-






γ ˆ  69 
 Table B3 Parental Networks Effect on the Probability of Finding the First Job in a 
Specific Plant, Baseline Within-Class and Neighborhood estimates 












  0.111 0.074  0.087  0.013  0.081 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.151 0.110  0.117  0.021  0.116 
(s.e.)  (0.003)** (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)** 




  0.056 0.032  0.061  0.009  0.045 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 





  0.081 0.053  0.063  0.012  0.058 
(s.e.)  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.065 0.041  0.055  0.009  0.048 
(s.e.)  (0.002)** (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 




  0.102 0.067  0.068  0.013  0.067 
(s.e.)  (0.003)** (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
N  13,105 26,035  32,224  10,067  81,431 
Note: Estimates of parent network effects. An observation is a combination of class, plant, and year of first job. 
Weighted by the number of graduates with parents in the plant. Data are for graduates 1988-1995 finding a stable job 
within 7 years of graduation. Standard errors are cluster-corrected for dependencies within class. **Significant at the 
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